The FBI and domestic counterterrorism: a comparative analysis by Fears, Karla P.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
1995-12
The FBI and domestic counterterrorism: a
comparative analysis
Fears, Karla P.
Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/31309
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL 
MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA 
THESIS 
THE FBI AND 
DOMESTIC COUNTERTERRORISM: 
A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
by 
Karla P. Fears 
December  1995 
Thesis Advisor: Frank M. Teti 
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. 
jp^rr, ÄTT(V 
"■täO'Ä'iaJü i 
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data 
sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other  R 
aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and 
Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway. Suite 1204, .Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget. Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) 
Washington DC 20503.  
I.      AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 2.      REPORT DATE 
December 1995 
3.     REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED 
Master's Thesis 
TITLE AND SUBTITLE: The FBI and Domestic Counterterronsm: A 
Comparative Analysis  
6.    AUTHOR: Karla P. Fears, LCDR, USN 
FUNDING NUMBERS 
7.     PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
Naval Postgraduate School 




SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10.    SPONSORING/MONITORING 
AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 
11.   SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the 
official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.  
12a. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT 
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. 
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 
13.   ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words) 
This thesis is an attempt to analyze the effectiveness of the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI) in countering domestic terrorism in comparison to other demoracies.  In 
the first chapter, there is an attempt to define terrorism by examining the historical 
development and early attempts at defining terrorism.  The second chapter describes the 
history of the FBI and its early battles with domestic terrorists, including infringements upon 
constituional rights.   The third chapter relates Israel's problems with domestic terrorism by 
outlining the professional development and tragic errors of the Shin Bet (Israel's domestic 
security service).  Great Britain's attempts to crush the Irish Republican Army are the 
subject of the fourth chapter.  The fifth chapter concludes by demonstrating that each 
country has sought to eliminate domestic terrorism but no matter what method is used, 
eventually, they are forced to negotiate with the terrorists. 
14    SUBJECT TERMS    FBI, Counterterrorism, Terrorism 15.   NUMBER OF 
PAGES: i ?R 
16.    PRICE CODE 
17.   SECURITY CLASSIFICA- 
TION OF REPORT 
Unclassified 
18.   SECURITY CLASSIFI- 
CATION OF THIS PAGE 
Unclassified 
19.   SECURITY CLASSIFICA- 
TION OF ABSTRACT 
Unclassified 
20. LIMITATION OF 
ABSTRACT 
UL 
NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89) 
Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239-18 298-102 
11 
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. 
THE FBI AND DOMESTIC COUNTERTERRORISM: 
A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
Karla P. Fears 
Lieutenant Commander, United States Navy 
B.S., Colorado State University, 1981 
Submitted in partial fulfillment 
of the requirements for the degree of 




NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL 
December 1995 
Karla P. Fears 
Frank M. Teti, Thesis Advisor 
hnson, Second Reader 
Frank M. Teti, Chairman 




This thesis is an attempt to analyze the effectiveness of the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI) in countering domestic terrorism in comparison to other 
demoracies. In the first chapter, there is an attempt to define terrorism by 
examining the historical development and early attempts at defining terrorism. The 
second chapter describes the history of the FBI and its early battles with domestic 
terrorists, including infringements upon constituional rights. The third chapter 
relates Israel's problems with domestic terrorism by outlining the professional 
development and tragic errors of the Shin Bet (Israel's domestic security service). 
Great Britain's attempts to crush the Irish Republican Army are the subject of the 
fourth chapter. The fifth chapter concludes by demonstrating that each country has 
sought to eliminate domestic terrorism but no matter what method is used, 
eventually, they are forced to negotiate with the terrorists. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Terrorism has existed as a form of warfare since prehistoric periods. Although it was 
not coined as an official term until the eighteenth century, the phenomenon itself is not new. 
If one may be so bold, Moses used a form of God-supported terrorism in his efforts to break 
away from the Pharaoh of Egypt. Although some might disagree with this insight, since 
Moses was trying to do good, it is certain the Egyptians did not feel this way. Eventually, this 
form of terrorism was successful The Assassins, a sect of the larger Ismaili sect of Muslims, 
developed a specific religious doctrine which justified the murder of their religious and 
political rivals They were later suppressed by the Mongols The Catholic church was not 
above using a form of religious terrorism during the Dark and Middle Ages, threatening 
hapless populations with a life in hell if they did not follow the tenants of the church. They 
were able to manipulate, dominate and prosper by threats of excommunication and the 
Inquisition. The common thread of this form of terrorism is an effort at religious dominance. 
This brings to mind the definition of "terrorism." Although activities characterized 
as terrorism have escalated and declined with world situations, there really is no precise or 
widely-accepted definition This is made more difficult by the fact that the word "terrorism" 
has currently become a fad word applied liberally to a variety of acts of violence which may 
not be terrorism Governments label violent acts committed by their political opponents as 
terrorism while antigovernment groups claim to be the victim of terrorism perpetrated by the 
government  The use of the word "terrorism" depends on one's point of view and implies a 
moral judgment.   If the label "terrorist" can be successfully applied by one party on its 
opponent, that party persuades the majority to adopt their moral viewpoint.1 
One of the myriad difficulties in defining "terrorism," "terrorist," or "terroristic," is 
the relativity of these concepts This comes from differing perspectives and conflicting 
interests of those who have attempted to define terrorism. Also, there are intrinsic 
complications in reaching a neutral definition of a concept that has strong ideological and 
emotional implications 2 
Terrorism may refer to actions primarily conducted to produce fear and alarm in order 
to serve a variety of purposes. In general, however, it is frequently applied to similar acts of 
violence—ransom kidnapings, hijackings, sensational killings— which may not be intended 
by the perpetrators to produce terror. Once a group acquires the label "terrorist," everything 
they do, whether intending to produce terror or not, becomes a terrorist act If the group 
robs a bank or an arsenal, acts which are usually considered urban guerrilla tactics, these acts 
then become terrorist acts. The difficulties in arriving at a definition of terrorism have 
resulted in the cliche that "one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter."3 
'This viewpoint was originally presented by Brian M. Jenkins to the Joint National 
Meeting of the Operations Research Society of America and the Institute for Management 
Sciences, New York, May 1-3, 1978. 
2Ezzat A. Fattah, "Terrorist Activities and Terrorist Targets: A Tentative 
Typology", Behavioral and Quantitative Perspectives on Terrorism,pg  12. 
"'Jenkins, pg. 4. 
Terrorism, according to the Rand Corporation, is defined by the nature of the act, not 
by the identity of the perpetrators or the nature of their cause All terrorist acts are crimes 
but all crimes are not terrorist acts. Terrorist acts also would be in violation of the rules of 
war if the state of war existed These acts involve violence or the threat of violence coupled 
with specific demands and the violence is directed mainly against civilian targets. Political 
motives are the driving force behind the violence and those actions are generated to garner 
maximum publicity. 
This definition is not restricted solely to nongovernmental groups. Sometimes 
governments with their armies and their secret police may also be terrorists. The threat of 
torture is a form of terrorism intended to create dread of the regime and obedience to 
authorities Some scholars use terrorism to refer to nongovernmental groups while the term 
"terror" applies to similar incidents carried out by the state. This distinction may be due to 
the fact that while most nongovernmental acts of terror are international, state terrorism is 
internal This does not rule out international incidents of state terrorism such as the 
assassination of Trotsky.4 
A stumbling block in defining terrorism, according to criminologist Grant Wardlaw, 
is a moral problem Attempts at definition are often based on the assumption that some types 
of political violence are justifiable while others are not The latter is usually classed as 
terrorism while the former is uncertain   Two examples of this uncertainty are the United 
4Jenkins, pg. 5. 
States Air Force secret bombing of Laos and Israel's preemptive strike against a nuclear 
reactor in Iraq in 1981 
The bombings of Laos were justified by the United States government originally 
because Pathet Lao forces shot down two "reconnaissance" aircraft. Later on, the bombing 
continued because communists from North Vietnam were assisting the Pathet Lao and 
bringing supplies into Laos via the Ho Chi Minh Trail. Targeting was very tight but it did not 
prevent civilian casualties and disruption 
The Israelis were disturbed when they discovered the Iraqis had a nuclear 
development program. Although Iraq and Iran were engaged in conflict, the Israeli 
government believed that the nuclear program was aimed at their eventual destruction. They 
attempted to halt the progress of this program by appealing to France and the United States 
but Iraq did not respond to this pressure. Prime Minister Menacham Begin realized that an 
airstrike would bring down condemnation from world governments and might even bring Iran 
and Iraq together but he felt a preemptive move was the lesser of all evils On June 7, 1981, 
the Israelis Ar Force bombed the nuclear reactor at al-Tuweitha and completely destroyed 
it.  One French technician and nine Iraqis were killed. 
Although the Pathet Lao and their communist supporters condemned the bombings, 
the United State government believed it was justified in order to maintain democratic freedom 
in Southeast Asia. In their view, the perceived ends justified the means. The Israelis believed 
the same, even in the face of world condemnation 
In Wardlaw's view, a definition must transcend behavioral descriptions, including 
individual motivation, social milieu, and political purpose. Unfortunately, this has been 
difficult in the past because scholars have found it easier to focus on behaviors and their 
effects rather than consider motives and politics.5 
Wardlaw also suggests that academics find it difficult to communicate with 
policymakers and law enforcers because the latter cannot reconcile analytical techniques with 
the real world. This lack of reconciliation is seen as an inability to distinguish between "right" 
and "wrong" acts. Therefore, Wardlaw believes that the definition should be based on moral 
justification; the proper study of terrorism should explain the phenomenon not justify it.6 
In order to understand the nature of terrorism, Wardlaw believes that one must 
examine its relationship to other forms of civil, military and political violence and criminal 
behavior He quotes Wilkinson who noted that "one of the central problems in defining 
terrorism lies with the subjective nature of terror."7 The use of terror does not necessarily 
have to be politically motivated. Many criminals resort more and more to "terrorist" tactics 
for personal gain. Sociopathic individuals may terrorize due to their condition. Some 
members of society may be bored and frustrated with society and may terrorize to vent their 
rage or engage in symbolic acts of protest.   Distinctions between these various forms of 
5Grant Wardlaw, Political Terrorism: Theory, Tactics and Countermeasures 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), p 4 
6Ibid., pg. 5. 
7P Wilkinson, Terrorism and the Liberal Stale (London: Macmillan, 1977), pg. 
terrorism may be blurred by the fact that criminals or sociopaths who engage in terrorism may 
pretend to legitimate themselves by adopting political slogans and collaborating with official 
terrorist movements who often recruit them.8 
In the context of this thesis, terrorism can be defined as "a symbolic act designed to 
influence political behavior by extranormal means, entailing the use or threat of violence."9 
Terrorism is the employment of terror as a weapon of psychological warfare for political ends. 
It can also be used as a deliberate method of guerrilla warfare and therefore serving military 
ends Terrorism may achieve political ends by mobilizing forces sympathetic to the cause of 
the terrorists or by immobilizing the forces of the incumbent authorities. 
A.        THE DEVELOPMENT OF TERRORISM 
As mentioned previously, terrorism goes back to the development of prehistoric man. 
It is an outgrowth of guerrilla warfare, which may be the oldest form of warfare. Prehistoric 
man fought in some kind of guerrilla fashion in order to keep his neighbors on their toes. It 
was a matter of survival. Later this type of fighting became more organized as armies came 
into being and conventional warfare emerged.10 
The terms "terrorism" and "terrorist" have their beginnings in the French Revolution. 
Terrorism was defined in the Dictionnaire de la Academie Fran^aise as a system or regime 
8Wardlaw, pg. 9. 
9T.P Thornton, "Terror As a Weapon of Political Agitation" in H. Eckstein (ed.), 
Internal War (London: Collier-Macmillan, 1964), pg. 73. 
10- Wardlaw, pg. 18. 
of terror in 1798 but a French dictionary published in 1796 referred to the fact that the 
Jacobins or revolutionaries used the term in a positive sense when discussing their activities. 
Not long after that, "terrorist" became an epithet with criminal implications. Since that time 
terrorism has been used to represent almost every imaginable form of violence, although many 
forms may not be in accordance with the broad definitions discussed earlier." 
After the French Revolution, terrorism found another niche during the later part of the 
nineteenth century. It was used extensively by the Russian revolutionaries in 1878 - 1881 and 
by radical national groups in Ireland, Macedonia, Serbia, and Armenia. Anarchists in France, 
Italy, Spain and the United States also embraced terrorism as a means to an end in 1890 ,2 
In Russia, historically, one of the most important terrorist movements was the 
Narodnaya Vofya, which operated between January 1878 and March 1881 This organization 
evolved a specific policy of terrorism and was responsible for a concerted terrorist campaign 
against the Tsar and his authority. According to one of their theoreticians, terrorism was 
considered a cost-effective form of struggle while ethically a superior choice to the mass 
carnage resulting from an insurrection The difference between this terrorist campaign and 
the anarchist activities taking place elsewhere in Europe was that the Narodnaya Volya's 
terrorism was a directed campaign while anarchist terror tended to be an individual activity.13 
uWardlaw, pg 18. 
12Ibid 
,3Ibid.,pg. 19. 
Narodnaya Volya faded as a group and with it, terrorism The new wave of Russian 
terrorism surfaced in 1902 with the formation of the Social Revolutionary Party. Their theory 
for using terrorism was significantly different from previous terrorist campaigns. Instead of 
using terrorism as a solitary weapon to replace mass struggle, it was a tool to supplement and 
strengthen the revolution of the masses. This new theory was more attractive to the populace 
whereas the theory espoused by the Narodnya Volya was appealing to the intelligentsia.14 
Although anarchists were also considered terrorists, there was a distinct difference 
between their ideology and that of the revolutionaries Anarchists believed in the destruction 
of the prevailing social order because any state was exploitative. Violence and bloodshed 
were the only purgatives to cleanse society. Socialists, who used terrorism strictly as a tool, 
viewed the anarchists as fanatical and dangerous because they promulgated no concrete ideas 
for a future society. Further deviation of socialist and anarchist dogma was the value of the 
proletariat. Socialists assigned the mission of overthrowing capitalism to the proletariat while 
anarchists put their faith in peasants and thieves. In the anarchists' view, numbers who were 
willing to undertake acts of violence were primary to the vanguard 
After the First World War, terrorism was at a standstill. No one was interested in 
social change because it had been wrought by the war The depression set in and was 
followed by the Second World War During this war, there were many technological 
advances in the military and civilian sectors; Mao Tse-tung exploded onto the scene, 
14 Wardlaw, pg. 19 
successfully if not brutally bringing communism to China. After the Second World War 
ended, the world was ripe for change. The United States and the Soviet Union had come out 
as big winners and began to compete for hegemonic control of the world through military 
might. 
In the Middle East, Israel declared independence in order to establish a Jewish 
homeland as part of their covenant with God. Unfortunately, the Palestinians who lived there 
were not happy about being displaced for a covenant not of their making. 
The French pulled out of Vietnam after their ignominious defeat at Dienbienphu and 
the United States stepped in to advance their "domino theory" as their fear of communist 
domination increased with the establishment of East Germany, North Korea, and Cuba. 
Having decided that Asia was ready for democracy, United States policymakers ascertained 
that if Vietnam fell to communism, the whole of Asia would be under communist rule. Ho 
Chi Minn, leader of the Vietminh, began a guerrilla campaign against the Americans, 
occasionally using terrorism as a form of psychological warfare. 
The Vietnam War inspired students to think of government in a whole new way. 
Although the victories won by the Allies in the Second World War had made democracy a 
popular form of government, these young people and some older socialists saw American 
efforts to push democracy in Vietnam as imperialist expansionism It was their duty to expose 
this crime to the masses Out of student protest groups grew the second generation of 
terrorists in Europe and the United States. 
Protesters were particularly active in West Germany where a group of left-wing, 
politically intellectual men and women organized underground publications and peaceful 
protests in sympathy with antiwar activists in the United States. The objective changed when 
the leader of the left-wing group, Rudi Dutschke, began to notice that the coalition 
government set up under the Marshall Plan had no opposition in the parliament. Dutschke 
questioned the legitimacy of the coalition, stating that it was no less autocratic than the Nazi 
regime had been In fact, some former members of the Nazi party had been retained to fill 
important positions within the coalition. This was intolerable to Dutschke who took a radical, 
oppositional stance toward the government and confronted them with violence. He 
considered their idea of society inhuman and decadent and felt his behavior was justified 
The anti-authoritarian student movement began to spread under the direction of 
Dutschke throughout Germany. By 1968, their actions began to reflect the revolutionary 
groups of the Third World, mainly because the violence against "dictatorship" and "terror 
from above" those groups used justified the students' violence against a democratic society. 
This student movement decided to base their revolution on a mixture of tenets espoused by 
Hegel, Marx, Lenin, Mao, Ho Chi Minh, Stokely Charmichael, Eldridge Cleaver, Che 
Guevara and Jean-Paul Sartre. All of them underlined this doctrine: "A guerrilla fighter slays 
his enemy In that act of pure violence, there is a double act of liberation. The victim has 
been freed from his false role and the victor has freed his own spirit for authentic manhood."15 
15Ovid Demaris, Brothers in Blood (New York: Charles Scribner and Sons  1977) 
Pg-221. 
10 
This was a dialectic solely concerned with life and death and was meant to give legitimacy to 
their violent actions. 
Meanwhile, in Italy, the Red Brigades were also formed in response to student and 
labor unrest of the late 1960s. Formerly activists in the Italian Communist Party, their 
objective was to educate, organize and encourage the working classes to throw off the 
oppressive rule of capitalism by an armed proletarian revolution. From the beginning, the Red 
Brigades were committed to using violence against the state in order to overthrow the Italian 
government which was experiencing a political and economic crisis because the socialists in 
power could not develop effective coalitions.16 
In contrast with international terrorist incidents in Western Europe and the Middle 
East, spectacular incidents rarely happened in the United States during the 1970s. The 
smaller incidents were not generally made known or publicized outside a small circle of 
policy, intelligence and law-enforcement officials so the general American public was able to 
ignore the problem. 
During this decade, bombings were the most popular method for instituting terror 
within the United States. Since most of the terrorist groups were small and relatively 
unsophisticated, bombings were the simplest strategy because they required little technical 
expertise, little risk and little organization   This accounted for bombings being the highest 
16Angelo M. Codevilla, "Italy: Political Violence in the Heart of NATO," 
International Security Review (February, 1981) p. 104 
11 
percentage of terrorist acts    From 1970 to 1980, there were four-hundred twenty-seven 
bombing incidents within the United States which resulted in one-hundred one deaths.17 
Most of the domestic terrorist activities were carried out by three groups during the 
1970s. The Weather Underground was responsible for forty-six bombings which included the 
Pentagon, the State Department and the Capitol In support of independence for Puerto Rico, 
the Fuerzas Armadas de Liberation National (FALN) accomplished fifty-eight bombings 
between 1975 ard 1980. From 1974 to 1978, the New World Liberation Front (NWLF) 
carried out seventy bombings in the San Francisco Bay area.18 
Towards the end of the decade, terrorist incidents declined in the United States, which 
was attributed to the improved counterterrorist abilities of the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
(FBI) Although they acknowledged that domestic terrorism was far from being checked, the 
lack of terrorist activity during the 1980s changed priorities for the FBI. 
Several theories have been advanced as to why terrorism in the United States did not 
reach the tragic proportions exhibited in Western Europe and the Middle East. Colonel James 
B. Motley of the National Defense University offered four reasons. First, the relative absence 
of political terrorism in the United States can be attributed to social and political "safety 
valves." Second, "terrorism is in the eye of the beholder " Perceptions of the severity of 
terrorism are based on spectacular acts, not statistics   Few terrorist incidents in the 1970s 
l7James B. Motley, US Strategy to Counter Domestic Political Terrorism 
(Washington DC: National Defense University Press) p. 15 
18Motley, pg. 19. 
12 
qualified as national media events Third, foreign terrorists rarely operated on American soil 
during this time The fourth reason may be the lack of lethality associated with terrorist 
incidents in the United States Most of the bombings were directed against property and with 
an average of eight deaths a year, this hardly seemed significant to the American public 19 
From the brief history of terrorism cited here, it is obvious that terrorism will continue 
to plague democracies as long as it remains effective   The question is, have policymakers in 
the United States realized the seriousness of domestic and international groups perpetrating 
terrorism on American soil? 
B.        THE PURPOSE OF TERRORISM 
The use of terror to introduce and exploit fear may serve a number of purposes. 
Depending on the situation, terrorism may be directed simultaneously at several objectives, 
both strategic and tactical.20 
One of the principle aims of terrorism is to divide the population from the government 
and/or authority figures that represent that government Success is guaranteed if the terrorists 
have low levels of actual political support but high potential for such support. If the potential 
is low, then terrorism may be counterproductive leading to outrage and revulsion from the 
masses. It may also lead to counter-violence from vigilante groups or rival terrorist units. 
I9Motley, pg. 21. 
20Wardlaw, pg. 34. 
13 
The original terrorists' actions will then be neutralized, making their influence on policy 
and/or constitutional changes ineffective. 
Fear and the psychology behind it is the primary road to success for terrorists. It is 
necessary for them to know the effects of disorientation and the nature of the society they are 
trying to affect. They must disorient the population by demonstrating the government's 
inability to provide security for them, including safety and order. More importantly, however, 
they must isolate citizens to prevent them from drawing strength from the usual social 
supports, forcing them to depend upon their own resources. As Thornton puts it, 
"Disorientation occurs when the victim does not know what he fears, when the source of his 
fear lies outside his field of experience."21 
The results of instilling fear to produce personal disorientation can be unpredictable. 
First, political action, the goal of the terrorists, may not be provoked by fear. The populace 
may develop a psychological tolerance to the violence which can be a precursor to hostility. 
That ensuing hostility may be directed towards the terrorists or the government for their 
inability to provide security; this may be an unacceptable risk to the terrorist group 
A second factor is terrorist use of propaganda. The aim of this propaganda must be 
to tip the balance so that the government becomes the target for people's aggression. This 
is a delicate, difficult operation and many terrorist groups have failed and been destroyed due 
to their lack of finesse 
21Thornton, pg. 74 
14 
Some terrorism theorists disagree over the extent to which the success of terrorism 
depends on polarization of the society Theodore R. Gurr argues that terrorism will not result 
in long-term ideological support. "Support given under coercion is unlikely to develop into 
a more enduring allegiance unless it can be systematically maintained over a long period"22 
Leites and Wolf, on the other hand, believe that unconditional support of the populace is not 
necessary They maintain that all a terrorist campaign needs from a large proportion of the 
population is "nondenunciation" or malleability.23 
A goal of terrorist tactics, related to community disorientation, is provoking the 
government into invoking illegal or unconstitutional repressive measures or forcing 
intervention by a third party If the government uses illegal methods which deprive ordinary 
citizens of their human rights in order to suppress terrorists, they may lose legitimacy and 
public confidence and support Carlos Marighela was quite specific about this method in his 
Mitrimatmal of the Urban Guerrilla. "The government can only intensify it repression, thus 
making the lives of its citizens harder than ever. Homes will be broken into, police searches 
will be organized, innocent people will be arrested and communications will be broken. 
10. 
22T R. Gurr, Why Men Rebel (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970), pg. 
23N Leites and C Wolf, Rebellion and Authority (Chicago: Markham, 1970), pg. 
15 
Police terror will become the order of the day and there will be more and more political 
murders."24 
Publicity is also an aim of terrorism, sometimes the primary aim. By staging 
spectacular acts guaranteed to gain world attention, terrorists achieve recognition of their 
cause and project themselves as a force that must be reckoned with. Because terrorist groups 
are usually very small, they must indulge in dramatic and shocking violence to be noticed and 
the media has become an important catalyst for expression of the terrorists' message. 
Terrorist activities have many ambitions The primary aim is to create fear and gain 
concessions. They also strive to obtain maximum publicity for their cause, provoke 
repression, break down social order and build morale in the movement. Their success is 
dependent on the accuracy of the terrorist calculations concerning timing, degree and type of 
terrorist activities 25 
C.        THESIS 
Terrorism will continue to have high and low activity; groups will form and dissolve. 
But the threat will always be present waiting to strike at the most opportune instant. The 
termination of the cold war has brought some peace around the world but the new way of 
warfare is regional conflict. This is the perfect setting for terrorism. 
24Carlos Marighela, Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla (Harmondsworth: 
Penguin, 1971), pg. 95. 
25Wardlaw, pg. 42 
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The United States had some dealings with domestic terrorism, as mentioned 
previously, but it seemed insignificant compared with international terrorism. The FBI was 
able to handle those groups and eventually brought them down through various tactics such 
as infiltration and slander If any American lives were lost in terrorist incidents, they 
happened overseas, not on American soil 
On 26 February 1993, the bombing of the World Trade Center brought Americans out 
of their fog of false security The Atlantic Ocean was no longer a barrier to those who 
wanted to get to the United States and commit terrorist acts. On 19 April 1995, the bombing 
of the federal building in Oklahoma, which left one-hundred sixty-eight people dead showed 
that domestic terrorists were alive and well International terrorists were not the only danger 
to this country Domestic terrorists did not have to be part of an organized group. Although 
tragic, it was sensational in its violence and brought to the forefront the grievances of 
paramilitary and white supremacist groups who swore they had nothing to do with it but rode 
the wave of insecurity exhibited by the population. 
Although the FBI was successful in apprehending the alleged perpetrators, the events 
had already occurred and people were dead. In my thesis, I want to explore the effectiveness 
of the FBI in countering terrorism that may escalate. I define "effectiveness" as exploiting 
intelligence received on domestic terrorist groups so that they can be stopped before the 
incident occurs. I will take into account the parameters under which the FBI must operate 
in establishing an effective response to terrorism in a democratic system. 
17 
My methodology will be comparative. In Chapter II, I will examine historical 
evidence of the FBI's fight against domestic terrorism under the restrictions of the Attorney 
General's Guidelines This will include a look at their circumventions of these guidelines 
through unconstitutional operations and the use of the military. In Chapters III and IV, I will 
explore Israel and Great Britain, two other democracies in which domestic terrorism has 
flourished. Successes and failures as well as the proposed loss of some democratic freedoms 
within those countries will be investigate as well as their battles with the Palestinians and the 
Irish Republican Army respectively. In Chapter V, I will examine my findings and propose 
solutions. 
II. THE FBI AND COUNTERTERRORISM 
Domestic counterterrorism in the United States has not been as troublesome as in 
other countries This country has been fortunate because, in the past, it was geographically 
and economically difficult for international terrorists to operate successfully. Our fortunes 
have changed in the 1990s with the World Trade Center and Oklahoma bombings. These 
events have catapulted the FBI into the media spotlight and has the public speculating 
whether or not the FBI is equipped to deal with the increased threat. In this chapter, I will 
be examining the FBI's historical dealings with counterterrorism and their preparations for 
managing counterterrorism today 
A.        HISTORY 
The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) is responsible for the investigation and, if 
possible, the prevention of domestic terrorist activities. This is obviously a carry over from 
their early fight against gang crime and later, their dubious successes with their 
Counterintelligence Program (COINTELPRO). Although these activities usually did not 
involve outsiders, J. Edgar Hoover, the first director, considered gangs', communists', and 
hategroups' endeavors a form of terrorism against the Federal government 
The agency now known as the FBI was founded in 1908 when Attorney General 
Charles J Bonaparte appointed an unnamed force of Special Agents to be the investigative 
force of the United States Department of Justice Prior to that time, the Department of 
Justice borrowed agents from the United States Secret Service to investigate violations of 
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federal crime laws within its jurisdiction.26 This special agent force was named the Bureau 
of Justice in 1909 and, after several other name changes, became the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation in 1935. 
During the early period of the FBI's existence, its agents investigated violations of 
some of the comparatively few federal criminal violations which existed, such as bankruptcy 
frauds, antitrust crime, and neutrality violations. During the first World War, the Bureau was 
given responsibility for espionage, sabotage, sedition, and draft violations. Passage of the 
National Motor Vehicle Act in 1919 further broadened the Bureau's jurisdiction.27 
After the passage of prohibition in 1920, the Gangster Era began. Criminals engaged 
in kidnaping and bank robbery, which were not federal crimes at that time This changed in 
1932 with the passage of a federal kidnaping statute and in 1934, when numerous other 
federal criminal statutes were passed and Congress gave Special Agents the authority to make 
arrests and to carry firearms 
The FBI's size and jurisdiction during the Second World War increased. With the end 
of the war and the advent of the Atomic Age, the FBI began conducting background security 
investigations for the White House and other government agencies, as well as internal security 
matters for the Executive Branch.28 
26 
'FBI Mission, History and Organization (Internet, Mww.ßi.gov, 1995), pg. 1 
27Ibid. 
28 Ibid., pg 2. 
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Civil rights and organized crime became major concerns of the FBI in the 1960s, as 
did counterterrorism, white-collar crime, drugs, and violent crimes during the 1970s and 
1980s With the end of the cold war, the FBI now concentrates its investigative efforts in 
seven major prrograms: counterterrorism, drugs/organized crime, foreign counterintelligence, 
violent crimes, white-collar crime, applicant matters and civil rights.29 
The FBI currently operates under a set of guidelines issued in 1983 by Ronald 
Reagan's Attorney General, William French Smith The Smith guidelines were a modification 
of guidelines issued by Gerald Ford's Attorney General Edward Levi in 1976. The Levi 
guidelines were criticized as being too restrictive and cumbersome. Although the Smith 
guidelines were developed to rectify the Levi guidelines, they have come under the same 
criticisms lodged against the Levi guidelines. 
The FBI's investigative mandate is the broadest of all federal law enforcement 
agencies The FBI therefore has adopted a strategic approach which stresses long-term, 
complex investigations. The FBI's investigative philosophy also emphasizes close relations 
and information sharing with other federal, state, local, and foreign law enforcement and 
intelligence agencies A significant number of FBI investigations are conducted in concert 
with other law enforcement agencies or as part of joint task forces. 
29 
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B.   THE FBI AND COUNTERTERRORISM: THE EARLY YEARS 
The FBI's first foray into domestic counterterrorism began with their domestic 
Counterintelligence Program (COINTELPRO), an ill-fated, tragic, unconstitutional but highly 
successful effort. In 1936, President Franklin D. Roosevelt was momumentally concerned 
about the extremist political developments in Europe and Asia. He informed Hoover that he 
was worried about the influence these fascis; and communist organizations would heavily 
influence extremist organizations in the United States. Hoover confirmed his fears and 
Roosevelt immediately ordered him to set in motion the machinery necessary to gather 
intelligence information on domestic communist and fascist organizations.30 
Hoover reminded FDR that it was unconstitutional to spy on American citizens 
especially when they were not engaged in illegal activities. It was not illegal for a U.S. citizen 
to be a member of a communist or fascist organization Under the FBI's Appropriations Act, 
however, they could undertake investigations of this type at the request of the secretary of 
state without going through Congress. A few days after that meeting, Hoover, Roosevelt and 
Secretary of State Cordell Hull met and set the stage for COINTELPRO They could not 
forsee the havoc that would be wrought in the coming years, at that time, Roosevelt was only 
interested in monitoring activities. Eventually, operations monitoring political expression 
would be expanded to include disruption as well.3' 
30 T James K. Davis, Spying on America: The FBI's Domestic Counterintelligence 
Program (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1992), pg. 26. 
31 Ibid., pg. 26 
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1. The CPUSA and COINTELPRO 
Monitoring began with the Communist Party of the United States of America 
(CPUSA). Activity was vigorous but, by 1940, the United States entered the Second World 
War and Hoover believed that extended operations were justified. Electronic surveillance, 
mail openings and surreptitious entry became routine and because of these added activities, 
the FBI's budget expanded to become forty-five percent of the entire Justice Department. 
When the war ended, Hoover could not bear to loose such a large budget. Fate was with him 
because the Soviet Union had become the enemy of the United States and a "cold war" began 
By 1956, several events had become public which supported Hoover's claims that the 
Communist party was a threat and had to be neutralized. The Alger Hiss affair, the arrest and 
subsequent conviction of the Rosenbergs, the Korean War, the Soviet atomic bomb test and 
the McCarthy hearings all served to support Hoover's pronouncement that communism was 
"a menace to the American way of life." At the 279th meeting of the National Security 
Council on March 8, 1956, Hoover received authorization for the operations that later came 
to be known as COINTELPRO 32 
The systematic destruction of the CPUSA began with the denial of communist 
infiltration into organizations such as the United Farm Workers and the National Organization 
for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP). The obstruction of infiltration by 
communists into the NAACP and other civil rights organizations was a particular obsession 
32 Davis, pg. 31. 
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with Hoover Martin Luther King, Jr was Hoover's particular target and he used 
COINTELPRO in a vigorous but futile effort to discredit King from 1957 until his death in 
1968. 
COINTELPRO stepped up its destruction of the CPUSA by adding anonymous 
mailings and infiltrations to the repetoire of dirty tricks The FBI would identify a member 
of the CPUSA and inform his/her employer or the media through letters written by 
rcerned citizens " Infiltration was particularly successful and by the time the Communist 
Party was debilitated, agents and informants were actually making party policy. When 
COINTELPRO began in 1956, the Communist Party in the United States had a membership 
of approximately 22,000. By 1971, the figure was down to three-thousand members but 
many were passive and others were FBI informants. 
2. The Ku Klux Klan and COINTELPRO 
In 1964, three members of the Council of Federated Organization, a civil rights group, 
were murdered by several Ku Klux Klan members near Meridian, Mississippi The news that 
these workers were missing captured the attention of the coumry and was very much in 
keeping with the Klan's intention to spread terror throughout the south. President Johnson 
felt that this terror and the apparent kidnaping of these workers was an intolerable situation. 
The FBI was already aware of these events and had been contemplating instituting a 
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COINTELPRO against the KKK When Johnson gave the word, the FBI was ready and 
moved.33 
After two months of gathering intelligence against the Klan, the Intelligence division 
recommended the immediate initiation of a "hard hitting closely supervised coordinated 
counterintelligence program to expose, disrupt, and otherwise neutralize the Ku Klux Klan 
and specified other hate groups".34 The techniques to be used were similar to those utilized 
against the Communist Party 
One very popular and successful technique involved sending anonymous or fictitious 
materials to Klan members. FBI informants operating within the Klan reported a dramatic 
impact on Klan morale. These mailings were used to create distrust, spread rumors, disrupt 
and neutralize Klan activities One mailing method included a postcard featuring derogatory 
cartoons of KKK members with simple messages. These messages were designed to play 
upon the Klan's greatest strength, its secrecy, and were very effective.35 
Another successful strategy was the "snitch-jacket" technique, which created an 
impression, through various communications media, that a Klan member was actually a police 
"Davis, pg. 75 
34Davis, pg. 76 
"Although the FBI had engaged in similar operations during the COINTELPROs 
against the Communist and Socialist parties, this did not make it lawful. They truly 
expanded the boundaries of unconstitutional behavior   The President and Hoover were 
aware of this and declined to inform the Attorney General, who had implemented specific 
guidelines against such behavior 
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informant    This created distrust and in-fighting.   A well-placed letter to a Klansman's 
employer was humiliating to that individual and also a successful deterrent. 
Klan units were also heavily infiltrated by informants, which provided complete 
membership lists for those anonymous mailings and intimate information about members that 
would have normally been unobtainable. For example, an informant discovered that a Klan 
member was collecting one-hundred percent disability from the Veteran's Administration 
(VA) while running a small contracting business The local field office contacted the VA and 
the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) with this information; the disability checks stopped 
immediately and the IRS made this man's life miserable. He certainly had no time to 
participate in Klan activities 
Although these operations successfully broke the back of the Ku Klux Klan, some 
infiltrations compromised the FBI. Gary Rowe was an employed informant for the FBI and 
because he rose very quickly in the Klan's hierarchy, his career came to an abrupt and tragic 
end on March 25, 1965. On that day, a civil rights rally took place in Montgomery, Alabama. 
Three Klan members and Rowe were assigned to monitor and, if possible, cause disruption.36 
As the men were driving through Selma, they noticed an out-of-state-car driven by a white 
female with a black male passenger. Mrs. Viola Liuzzo was a civil rights volunteer who was 
transporting demonstrators from Montgomery to Selma. The four men decided to follow 
Liuzzo's car as it headed toward Montgomery with the intention of "getting a black and a 
36 Davis, pg. 92 
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white together " Eventually, the Klan members and Rowe were able to move alongside Mrs 
Liuzzo's car They rolled down their windows and fired into her car. She died instantly but 
her passenger managed to keep the car under control and survived. Rowe maintained that 
he did not fire his weapon but he had been an accessory to the crime. He became the star 
witness against the three Klansmen who were convicted.37 
Because of this incident, President Johnson exerted more pressure on Hoover to 
disrupt the Ku Klux Klan into oblivion By 1968, the Ku Klux Klan was, for all practical 
purposes, decimated Undercover informants like Gary Rowe participated in eighty-five 
percent of Klan actions. At one point, the FBI had so thoroughly infiltrated the Klan, Hoover 
briefly considered installing an informant at the top of the organization to make Klan policy. 
When COINTELPRO ended, Klan membership had dropped from a high of 14,000 
to four thousand. The murderous fury had been contained but it was done at the expense of 
the Constitution. In successfully containing and neutralizing the Ku Klux Klan, the FBI had 
violated such constitutional liberties such as the right to privacy and the right to assemble 
3. The Black Panthers and COINTELPRO 
The FBI did not limit their disruption methods to white hate groups. They targeted 
black nationalist hate groups as well. The incident that brought these groups to the forefront 
was an attempt by a motorcycle police officer to arrest a black man in Watts, a suburb of Los 
Angeles,  for drunk driving   The man resisted and an angry crowd gathered.  Additional 
37 Ibid 
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police contingents managed to keep the situation calm but the next day, the Watts 
neighborhoods exploded into into racial disorder of such magnitude that sixteen-thousand law 
enforcement personnel including National Guardsmen moved in to restore order.38 
President Johnson was devastated that his "Great Society" seemed to be disintegrating 
and he turned to the FBI for help. As it turned out, the FBI had been conducting microphonic 
surveillance on one black separatist group since 1960 It was very easy to increase its 
investigative powers to determine the origins and extent of the racial unrest. After riots in 
Newark and Detroit in 1967, Johnson ordered the FBI to "search for evidence of conspiracy." 
The next COINTELPRO was developed against this backdrop and the object was to "expose, 
disrupt, misdirect, discredit or otherwise neutralize the activities of black nationalist hate type 
organizations." In order to ensure that the riots reduced, Hoover continued to increase his 
Black Hate COINTELPRO among his field offices. The program seemed to be just as 
successful as the one run against the Ku Klux Klan but for some unknown reason, they 
underestimated the most dangerous group.39 
The Black Panther party was founded by Huey Newton and Bobby Seale, two college 
students in Oakland in October 1966. Its purpose was to provide a unified black response to 
perceived police brutality in the Oakland area Many blacks felt they were living in a colony 
ruled by white police. 
38Theodore White, 77K? Making of the President 1968 (New York: Atheneum 
Publishers, 1969), pp. 25-27 
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Panther members began to appear in public carrying weapons but their first official 
action was directing traffic so that children could cross a busy street safely to get to school. 
They expanded their duties to include patrolling the crime-infested slums of Oakland, 
protesting rent evictions of African Americans and counselling welfare recipients. They also 
monitored the actions of the Oakland Police Department and worked with African American 
prisoners. 
They stepped into the national arena when forty members boldly entered the California 
State Legislature fully armed, in battle dress to protest a bill that would outlaw carrying 
loaded weapons in public They were all arrested but they became a household word 
overnight. 
In October 1967, the Black Panthers collided head-on with Oakland police Huey 
Newton and another Panther were stopped for a routine traffic violation. Newton got out of 
the car and shooting erupted. Newton was shot four times but survived. One police officer 
was killed in the melee and Newton went to prison. In spite of the Panthers' propensity for 
violence and their growing national reputation, the FBI did not bother to target them in this 
new COINTELPRO 40 
Confrontations between the Panthers and the police increased and still the FBI did not 
react. The San Francisco field office resisted including them in COINTELPRO because the 
field agents did not think the tactics used would be effective   Eventually, because of the 
40 Davis, pg. 104. 
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tremendous news coverage devoted to the Panthers, FBI headquarters overruled this decision. 
The public wanted to know what the FBI was doing about these threatening exploits and the 
FBI had no choice but to include them into the COINTELPRO target list. By 1968, Hoover 
described the Panthers as "the greatest threat to the internal security of this country."41 
As mentioned previously, the number one goal in this COINTELPRO was to prevent 
the unification of the black hate groups. Consolidation seemed to be Hoover's greatest fear. 
Goal number three called for the prevention of violence but most COINTELPRO action- 
achieved the opposite result. In fact, this COINTELPRO generated the most violence of any 
run by the FBI. By 1971, when all the COINTELPROs ended, the Black Panthers had beet, 
decimated due to violent death, exile and arrest.42 
COINTELPRO came to an ignominious and explosive end when a small group of 
burglars broke into an FBI field office in a Philadelphia suburb and stole one-thousand 
documents detailing the FBI's domestic intelligence operations within the United States The 
burglars, calling themselves the Citizens' Commision to Investigate the FBI, felt that these 
clandestine operations were reprehensible and served no useful purpose in a democratic 
society. They believed they were justified in commiting a crime to expose a crime. 
When Hoover was finally informed of this break-in, he was livid   The sacred walls of 
the FBI had been breached and classified documents had been professionally stolen by an 
4,Ibid., pg. 105. 
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unknown group He mounted the largest investigation to discover the identity of the 
perpetrators but they were never apprehended. The documents were distributed to every 
major newspaper in the United States, but at the request of Attorney General Mitchell, The 
New York Times and the Los Angeles Times refrained from printing the documents. The 
Washington Post, however, deemed that this was a "significant matter of public controversy" 
and went ahead with the story. This was the darkest period in the existence of the FBI.43 
4. The US Military and Law Enforcement 
In the late 1960s, the military worked closely with state and local police and National 
Guard units to coordinate scenarios for the implementation of martial law. Senator Sam 
Ervin's Constitutional Rights Subcommittee discovered a master plan called Garden Plot 
which was too unspecific to concern Ervin. Several years later a freelance journalist 
uncovered a sub-plan of Garden Plot called Cable Splicer which involved the Sixth Army. 
Cable Splicer was developed in a series of California meetings from 1968 to 1972, 
involving Sixth Army, the Pentagon, National Guard generals, police chiefs, sheriffs, military 
intelligence officers, defense contractors and telephone and utility company executives The 
participants played war games using scenarios that began with racial, student and labor unrest 
and ended with the Army being called in to bail out the National Guard, usually sweeping the 
area to confiscate private weapons and round up likely troublemakers. These games were 
43 Davis, pg  123 
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conducted in secret, with the military personnel dressed in civilian clothes and arriving in 
nonmilitary transportation.44 
The United States Army's Counterintelligence Analysis Branch compiled 
organizational files, personality files, mug books and "black lists", resulting in more than 
117,000 documents There were other filing systems in other locations maintained by other 
elements of the military intelligence bureaucracy. The United States Army Intelligence 
Command (USAINTC) had a network of fifteen-hundred agents stationed in over three- 
hundred posts scattered throughout the country. These posts were stocked with 
communications equipment, tape recorders, cameras, lock-picking kits, lie detectors and 
interview rooms with two-way mirrors.45 
They also had direct lines to local police departments, teletype machines to field 
intelligence units, situation maps, closed-circuit television, and secure radio links. A one- 
hundred eighty man command center was created in 1968 after the assassination of Martin 
Luther King and the riots that followed.  Its primary targets were colleges and universities 
The Ervin subcommittee reported that military intelligence groups conducted offensive 
operations against anti-war and student groups, but the Pentagon refused to declassify the 
relevant records. Presumably they never reached the intensity of the FBI's COINTELPRO. 
When USATNTC's domestic surveillance activities were publicly disclosed in the early 1970s, 
44Daniel Brandt, "The 1960s and COINTELPRO: In Defense of Paranoia", Name 
Base Newsline, Number 10, July - September 1995, pg 3. 
45Bra?:dt, pg. 3. 
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public indignation and political reaction caused the Command's activities to be sharply 
curtailed   In 1974, USAINTC ceased to be a major Army command.  This was clearly a 
violation of the Posse Comitatus Act. 
C.        THE FBI AND COUNTERTERRORISM TODAY 
The FBI, as the lead Federal law enforcement agency in the fight against terrorism, 
defines terrorism as "the unlawful use of force or violence against persons or property to 
intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in 
furtherance of political or social objectives." The FBI's counterterrorism mission is to 
identify and neutralize the threat in the United States posed by terrorists and their supporters, 
whether nations, groups, or individuals. The FBI categorizes terrorism as either domestic or 
international depending on the origin, base and objectives of the terrorist 
organization/individual   Domestic terrorism comes under the FBI's auspices.46 
Acts constituting terrorism include terroristic assassination, hijacking, kidnaping, 
hostage-holding, bombing, arson, armed attack, and extortion. Because major acts of 
terrorism are violations of both state and federal law, concurrent criminal jurisdiction is the 
rule. Accordingly, the federal government can either act or defer to state jurisdiction and 
action depending on the nature of the incident and the capabilities of local authorities to deal 
46 Department of Justice, Terrorism m the United Slates, 1994 (1995), pg. 57. 
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with it   Appropriate federal law-enforcement assistance and support would be rendered upon 
request if local authorities are in charge.47 
The initial tactical response to a terrorist incident is made by the FBI Special Agent 
in Charge (SAC) at the scene. In describing the FBI's capabilities for responding to a 
domestic terrorist incident, former Deputy Attorney General Benjamin R Civiletti assured the 
Congress that "the government's capabilities to meet the kinds of terrorist acts likely to occur 
inside the United States are sound and sufficient". He also believed that "the plans and 
procedures for meeting and effectively handling such incidents do not involve any 
infringement, dilution, or disregard of civil and Constitutional rights "48 
The FBI possesses a wide range of capabilities to deal with possible domestic 
terrorism. Each FBI office and headquarters has contingency plans that of into effect when 
a terrorist incident occurs. Such plans are the cornerstone from which all other responses or 
actions will follow. They include, for example, the chain of command, communications both 
within and outside the FBI, and the availability for specialized equipment and personnel. 
In cases of involving hostage negotiations, teams of trained and experienced 
psychologists are available to provide on-the-scene psychological terrorist profiles and 
analyses to FBI hostage negotiators. The knowledge and experience gained by such teams 
is shared with local law enforcement agencies through training sessions 
47Motley, pg. 40 
48Motley, pg. 43. 
34 
Another asset that equips the FBI to respond to terrorist acts is the Special Operations 
and Research Unit (SOAR). This group of FBI special agents is trained in psychology and 
criminology The function of the SOAR unit is to accumulate and analyze facts about 
terrorist incidents and through papers, articles, seminars, and training sessions, to pass on to 
other law-enforcement bodies guidance on dealing with terrorism 
International terrorists operating in the United States are considered hostile foreign 
agents and are investigated under the Attorney General Guidelines for Foreign Intelligence 
Collection and Foreign Counterintelligence Investigations. These investigations are the 
responsibility of the FBI's Intelligence Division49 
Domestic terrorist groups originating in the United States are investigated pursuant 
to the Attorney General guidelines on General Crime, Racketeering Enterprise, and Domestic 
Security/Terrorism investigations Investigations of domestic terrorism are conducted under 
the Domestic Terrorism Subprogram of the Criminal Investigative Division's Violent Crime 
and Major Offenders Program 50 
The Counterterrorism Program (CTP) is responsible for preventing, interdicting, and 
investigating the violent acts and criminal manifestations of terrorist groups and individuals 
involved in terrorism and related activities. Therefore, the CTP activities can be broken down 
into two primary areas: (1) the prevention of terrorism through the timely development of 
49Department of Justice, pg. 57. 
50Ibid. 
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intelligence which is augmented by an exchange of information between the FBI and other 
agencies, both in this country and abroad, and (2) reaction to terrorist activity through 
criminal/counterterrorism investigations and other law enforcement options designed to arrest 
and convict terrorist groups' members and individuals who perpetrate other criminal acts 
related to terrorist activities 
Counterterrorism investigations are undertaken to detect, prevent, and/or react to 
unlawful, violent activities of individuals o; groups whose intent is to overthrow the 
government; interfere with the activities of a foreign government in the United States, 
substantially impair the functioning of the Federal Government, a state government, or 
interstate commerce; or deprive Americans or their civil rights as guaranteed by the 
Constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States. These criminal acts include violations 
of the Protection of Foreign Officials, Neutrality, and Extortion statutes, as well a firearms 
and explosives laws. Also, as a result of the passage of the Comprehensive Crime Control 
Act of 1984 (Title 18, USC, Section 1203, entitled "Hostage Taking"), the FBI acquired 
jurisdiction and authority to act, where appropriate, in certain terrorist-related hostage 
situations both within this nation and internationally.51 
Although the recorded number of actual terrorist incidents and terrorist incidents 
prevented in the United States has generally declined, this favorable trend should not be 
regarded as a signal that eradication of violent terrorism is close at hand. More properly, the 
5IDepartment of Justice, pg 58. 
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reduction in terrorist incidents in the United States closely corresponds to the FBI's 
acceleration of an all-out counterterrorist effort which has been characterized by the steady 
commitment of resources, enhanced counterterrorism training and more efficient use of an 
increasingly effective intelligence base. The success of the FBI in this regard is even more 
evident when the rather few incidents of terrorism in the United States are compared against 
the number committed worldwide. The FBI has therefore concluded that any relaxation in 
their current efforts to counter terrorist activities within the United States could be detected 
by terrorists and may result in a reversal of what has otherwise been a sustained downturn in 
violent terrorist activity.52 
The FBI is committed to a program of intensified investigative activity which will 
(hopefully) continue to successfully counter the violent intentions of terrorist organizations 
deployed in the United States. The arrest, prosecution and incarceration of key leadership 
elements of various terrorist organizations coupled with successful preventive measures has 
significantly contributed to the decline in the number of terrorist incidents committed in the 
United States It would, however, be incorrect to conclude from these counterterrorism been 
permanently eradicated 
The United States, because of its size, porous borders, open society, and official 
involvement in the global political arena, is constantly vulnerable to terrorist attacks in the 
United States in response to U.S. foreign policy initiatives or out of desire to neutralize 
52 Department of Justice, pg. 57 
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dissident behavior which may appear in emigre communities. Terrorist attacks by domestic 
terrorist groups also conti ;e to occur because perceived social and political conditions have 
not changed to their satisfaction. Therefore, the FBI must fully maintain its aggressive 
counterterrorism initiatives both at home and abroad 53 
In any given year, the FBI engages in approximately two dozen full domestic terrorism 
investigations. Over the years since the Smith guidelines were adopted, nearly two-thirds of 
these full investigations were opened before a crime had been committed. The FBI has 
investigated right-wing, anti-government, anti-tax, paramilitary and militia groups under this 
authority. They have been successful in preventing terrorist acts before they occurred. In 
1993, for example, the FBI arrested several skinheads in Los Angeles after a lengthy 
investigation determined that they had been discussing and planning attacks on an African 
American church, Jewish targets and other religious targets. 
On February 26, 1993, a massive explosion occurred in the garage area beneath the 
Vista Hotel, located at the World Trade Center complex in New York City. The bomb that 
caused the explosion consisted of approximately twelve-hundred pounds of explosives, 
making it one of the Lugest homemade bombs ever seen in the United States. Six persons 
were killed and approximately one thousand injured as a result of the attack. 
Four of the six defendants indicted were convicted on all thirty-eight counts against 
them, including conspiracy to bomb targets in the United States, the bombing of the World 
53 Ibid., pg. 59. 
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Trade Center, and the use of explosive devices. They were each sentenced to two-hundred 
forty years in prison and fined. 
A raid on a North Wildwood, New Jersey hotel by FBI Agents and local law 
enforcement officers on July 22, 1993 resulted in the arrest of Matarawy Mohammed Said 
Saleh He was charged with conspiracy to bomb several sites in New York City. The group, 
of which he was a part, had targeted the headquarters of the United Nations, the federal 
building which houses the New York FBI office, the Lincoln and Holland tunnels, Egyptian 
President Mubarak during his 1993 visit to New York, and at least two U.S. political figures 
In 1994, the FBI scored a coup against the Abu Nidal organization in the United 
States Three men were apprehended and subsequently pled guilty to conspiring to 
participate in a terrorist organization. This group smuggled, transferred, and transported 
currency, information, and intelligence to other members of the Abu Nidal organization and 
throughout the world This group also obstructed investigations, fraudulently obtained 
passports for the members, bought weapons, and collected intelligence information. 
In terms of domestic terrorism, two persons on the top ten fugitive list surrendered 
to the FBI in Chicago on December 6, 1994 Claude Daniel Marks and Donna Jean Willmott 
had been sought for eight years for assisting in an escape plan to liberate Oscar Lopez from 
the United States Penitentiary at Leavenworth, Kansas Lopez is a leader of the Armed 
Forces of National Liberation (FALN), a clandestine Puerto Rican terrorist group based in 
the continental United States. Since 1974, the FALN has been responsible for causing five 
deaths, eighty-four injuries and over $3 5 million in property damages. 
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A new development concerning terrorism within the United States has been the 
emergence of International Radical Terrorism (IRT). IRT may be defined as any extremist 
movement or group, which is international in nature and conducts acts of crime or terrorism 
under the banner of personal beliefs in furtherance of political, social, economic or other 
objectives. The FBI believes that along with continuing state sponsorship of international 
terrorism, IRT poses a significant threat to U.S. national security. The ever-present threat 
posed by state sponsors terrorism to U.S. interests cannot be discounted. These nation- 
states continue to use violence and fear in an attempt to bring about their demands. In fact, 
the phenomena of IRT continues to flourish , in part, due to the support provided by 
sovereign states such as Iran and Sudan.54 
Changing world conditions have also affected domestic terrorism within the United 
States. The threat from terrorism increases as changes occur within global politics which 
could have an undesirable effect on terrorists or their supporters. Within the 1990 through 
1994 time frame, events such as the ongoing Middle East peace process, the Provisional Irish 
Republican Army (PIRA) cease-fire agreement with the British Government, and the fall of 
the Soviet Union have each had a profound effect on terrorism 55 
Should the cease-fire agreement between PIRA and the British Government hold, or 
lead to further peace initiatives, this could radically change the face of terrorism in Great 
54Department of Justice, pg. 7. 
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Britain and impact on the United States, where many supporters of PIRA have been known 
to solicit funds and attempt to procure weapons to support PIRA's goals Further, terrorists 
who once enjoyed financial support from some former Soviet-Bloc states are now on their 
own with the collapse of the Warsaw Pact. 
Other political changes in global politics may also lead to a greater terrorist threat in 
the United States Since the beginning of the historic Middle East peace talks in October 
1991, Palestinian terrorist groups, Israeli right-wing organizations and radical Middle East 
governments which oppose these negotiations have threatened to derail the peace dialogues. 
These "rejectionists" have threatened to use any means available, including violence to impede 
the peace process The threat posed to the United States, which has taken a lead in this peace 
initiative, is ever present. 
D.        FBI SOLUTIONS 
For the most part, U.S. law enforcement initiatives have been somewhat successful 
at deterring individuals or groups engaged in terrorist activity from committing acts of 
terrorism against U.S. interests. Within the past five years, the U.S. counterterrorism 
response has successfully taken an aggressive approach to the problem of terrorism. Through 
this heightened proactive response, the FBI aggressively undertakes to identify and interdict 
the activities of terrorists before they strike. 
This preventative phase involves acquiring, through legal means, intelligence 
information related to groups or individuals who would choose terrorism as a means to 
threaten or attack Americans, U.S. interests, or foreign nationals within the United States. 
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The information acquired is carefully analyzed, approprately disseminated, and effectively 
used to prevent terrorist acts before they occur. The 1993 arrests of the New York City 
bomb conspirators demonstrates the effectiveness of this proactive approach. A potentially 
devastating series of bombings was averted 
US law enforcement agencies are unable to prevent all acts of terrorism When 
terrorist acts do unfortunately occur, the FBI and other law enforcement agencies have 
engaged in effective investigations which have resulted in successful criminal prosecutions. 
Successes such as the World Trade Center bombing investigation, which culminated in 
arrests, convictions, and imprisonment, and the Oklahoma investigation send a signal to 
would-be terrorists that the United States is a hostile environment for terrorists and that 
individuals willing to engage in criminal activities of this nature will not be tolerated. 
In addition to law enforcement initiatives, past success in the US. government's battle 
to eradicate the terrorist threat can be attributed, in a large part, to a joint counterterrorism 
effort among U.S. law enforcement agencies, luck and two oceans This coordinated effort 
has led to the formation of joint terrorism task forces. Additionally, increased cooperation 
among U.S. government agencies and departments with counterterrorism responsibilities has 
also lead to greater information sharing. 
An example of law enforcement agencies working together can be found in Texas 
A number of agencies in the central Texas region have joined together in a cooperative effort 
to address domestic terrorism    The Central Texas Counterterrorism Working Group 
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(CTWG) represents a proactive effort to respond to the threat of terrorism in an area of the 
United States brimming with strategic commercial sites and important military installations.56 
Past terrorist activity in the central Texas region demonstrates the need for a 
coordinated approach to counterterrorism. For years, the region served as the base of 
operations and support for several domestic terrorism groups. These ranged from right-wing, 
white supremacist groups to left-wing cells, such as the May 19 Communist Organization 
(M19CO). Several cases have illustrated the belief among terrorists that the Central Texas 
region represents a safe haven from apprehension One case involved Richard Scutari, head 
of security for the white supremacist group, the Order and one of the FBI's Top Ten Most 
Wanted fugitives for his part in the June 1983 murder of a talk show host in Denver, 
Colorado After the slaying, Scutari fled Colorado for central Texas, where fellow white 
supremacists provided him refuge. His subsequent capture in San Antonio, Texas, 
demonstrated the attraction of the area to domestic terrorists 
Members of the violent May 19 Communist Organization (M19CO) continue to 
maintain an active presence in the area The group's affiliation with the central Texas region 
dates back to the turbulent 1960s, when it operated freely among the less organized elements 
of the antiwar, antiestablishment movement. While these movements declined as the Vietnam 
War drew to a close, M19CO diversified into domestic terrorism and directly assisted in 
56Byron A Sage, Mack Wallace and Carolyn Weir, The Central Texas 
Counterterrorism Working Group (Internet, www., 1995), pg  1. 
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staging a series of criminal acts, ranging from armored car robbery and murder to the 
November 1983 bombing of the U.S. Capitol Building in Washington, DC. 
Of the seven individuals responsible for the Capitol bombing, three were from Austin, 
Texas and affiliated with M19CO's Austin cell. This cell was responsible for thefts of high 
explosives from the central Texas region. These explosives ultimately were used in the 
bombings in Washington, DC, New York City, and sites throughout the nation's northeast. 
A number of M19CO members continue to live in the central Texas region and could 
conceivably provide support to other members 
The Central Texas Counterterrorism Working Group initially formed in 1987 as a joint 
project by the San Antonio Office of the FBI, the Texas Department of Public Safety, and the 
Texas Railroad Commission to identify terrorist groups, activities, and potential targets of 
opportunity in the central region of Texas. This group is comprised of forty-six law 
enforcement agencies representing Federal, State, and local levels of jurisdiction. These 
agencies range from local metropolitan police departments and county sheriffs offices to the 
State's Department of Public Safety, the Texas Ranger Service, and the FBI.57 
During the eight years of this group's existence, they have met bimonthly in those 
locations that may provide targets of opportunity such as nuclear power plants and military 
installations. In addition to these meetings, the FBI has hosted joint training seminars which 
have focused on such topics as international terrorism, with guest speakers ranging from the 
7Byron A. Sage, et al., pg. 2 
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Israeli government and academic officials to leaders of Islamic mosques These seminars have 
also addressed domestic terrorism issues, with a primary focus on right-wing, white 
supremacist groups These particular seminars have included speakers from undercover 
officers and case agents to the Grand Dragon of the Texas Knights of the Ku Klux Klan. 
The Central Texas Counterterrorism Working Group grew out of a need to provide 
proactive counterterrorist security to a particularly vulnerable region of the nation. The key 
to its success is the high degree of cooperation that exists among the group's members as they 
share information and expertise to enhance the security of the entire region. This concept of 
informed preparedness could form the basis for similar interagency counterterrorism working 
groups in other regions of the nation.58 
Legislative initiatives have greatly aided the FBI in its counterterrorism mission 
Congress has played a vital role in this success by providing appropriate legal tools, in 
particular legislation entitled the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984 and the Omnibus 
Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986 These acts greatly expanded FBI 
jurisdiction to include investigation of terrorist acts abroad. More recently, the Aviation 
Security Improvement Act of 1990 has resulted in security enhancements at U.S. airports to 
ensure the safety of domestic air transportation systems. This act also ensured a greater 
cooperative effort between the FBI and the Federal Aviation Administration. 
58 Ibid , pg. 3 
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Many members of international terrorist groups are reluctant to carry out an attack 
in the United States   This reluctance may be due, in part, to the fear of jeapordizing their 
current immigration status; fund-raising capabilities; recruitment opportunities, propaganda 
activities to support their cause; and freedom of assembly within the United States. Many of 
the individual who are members of international terrorist groups are fleeing crackdowns from 
their home governments and have sought the safe haven or refuge which is available to 
immigrants and asylum seekers here in the United States   They live in freedom in the United 
States and continue activities in support of their cause, which may entail the use of 
propaganda activities to attract new members or supporters of their cause    Should they 
commit a violent act in which persons are injured or killed or property destroyed, they might 
alienate themselves and gain disfavor from individuals they are attempting to attract to their 
cause. Should they lose public sympathy or support then they also stand to lose the financial 
support upon which they may have come to rely on heavily 
There has been a decrease in Puerto Rican terrorism In the past, Puerto Rican 
terrorist groups struggling for Puerto Rico's independence from the United States have been 
responsible for the majority of terrorist incidents perpetrated by domestic terrorist groups 
within the United States. During the last five years, the number of incidents committed by 
Puerto Rican terrorist groups has steadily declined. In 1990, five terrorist acts were 
committed by Puerto Rican terrorist groups in the United States and Puerto Rico; in 1991, 
the number of incidents decreased yet again to four and in 1992, the number of incidents 
decreased yet again to one act of terrorism. During 1993 and 1994, no acts of terrorism were 
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committed by Puerto Rican terrorist groups. This apparent decrease may be due, in part, to 
the November 1993 political plebescite held in Puerto Rico in which a plurality of Puerto 
Ricans voted to maintain their commonwealth status. The results of this plebiscite appear to 
have deflated the independence movement of Puerto Rican nationalists, of whom only a very 
small, but militant faction, condone the use of terrorism as the primary method of operation.59 
The threat posed by other terrorist groups has remained constant. During the past five 
years, there have been twelve incidents of terrorism associated with groups such as the 
Animal Liberation Front, Up the IRS, and the Earth Night Action Group.  These groups, 
loosely defined as "special interest" terrorist groups, seek specific issue resolutions rather than 
widespread political changes. While the causes they promote may not be criminal, the means 
they use, violence and destruction, to attain their goals, are. These individuals differ from 
traditional law-abiding special interest groups through their utilization of criminal activity and 
violence as a means of achieving their goals 
The FBI also defines other acts of criminal violence as acts of terrorism. Violent 
attacks perpetrated against abortion clinics and their personnel may, in fact, be terrorist- 
related. As a result of the recent acts of violence targeted at abortion clinics, the Attorney 
General directed that the Department of Justice Task Force on Violence Against Abortion 
Providers be formed to actively investigate a possible criminal conspiracy to commit acts of 
violence against abortion doctors and/or their clinics. The FBI is part of this Task Force 
'Department of Justice, pg. 10. 
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which is also comprised of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, the US Marshals 
Service and criminal and civil rights attorneys from the Department of Justice.60 
The Attorney General Guidelines (AGG) states that a domestic security/terrorism 
investigation may be initiated when facts or circumstances reasonably indicate that two or 
more persons are engaged in an enterprise for the purpose of futhering political or social goals 
wholly or in part through activities that involve force or violence and a violation of the 
criminal laws of the United States. 
f:iven this narrow definition b the AGG, the majority of abortion-related 
investigations are not classifiable as "terrorist incidents" In many of the incidents, the 
perpetrator(s) are not identified. However, when the investigation reveals that two or more 
individuals are conspiring, the investigation is, at that point, reclassified as a domestic 
terrorism case and is then investigated by the task force 61 
Although the FBI is investigating abortion clinic crimes to determine their status as 
a terrorists, some pro-choice individuals consider those actions as terroristic whether or not 
they follow the Attorney General's Guidelines. Historical parallels have been drawn between 
anti-abortionists and opposers of civil rights African American voters were harrassed as are 
those women seeking legal abortions. Legislation was passed that made it more difficult for 
African Americans to vote; attempts have been made to overturn Roe v. Wade   Some African 
60Department of Justice, pg  19 
61Department of Justice, pg. 19 
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Americans were lynched or shot for being "uppity" because they continued to seek their 
rights; patients at abortion clinics are harassed Houses owned by African Americans and 
churches they attended were bombed indiscriminately as are the abortion clinics. 
This harassment was allowed to continue until the Federal government realized that 
establishing a civil rights law was not a guarantee that civil rights would be granted They 
sent in the National Guard to protect African Americans at the polls and passed stronger laws 
so that African Americans could vote safely. Before this happened, the Federal government 
either completely ignored the situation or said it was a local issue 
Pro-choice individuals also believe that until the anti-abortion groups organized under 
banners such as Operation Rescue, these terrorist tactics did not exist. As with the Ku Klux 
Klan, these groups spout rhetoric that incite fringe members to heinous actions; money flows 
into these groups but no one knows from where; some of these groups are supported by 
religious organizations who disavow any knowledge when violence occurs; and these groups 
tend to argue and operate based on fear and emotion. 
Terrorist groups categorized as "right-wing" are defined as being racist, anti-Semitic 
and are for the advancement of the white race In addition to advocating white supremacy 
and hatred of non-white races, these groups have also engaged in acts of provocation and 
assault against federal and state law enforcement officials. Groups such as Aryan Nations, 
the Order and Posse Comitatus fall into this category. The most significant instances of right- 
wing terrorism during the last five years occurred in July 1993, when members of the 
American Front Skinheads attempted to bomb the National Association for the Advancement 
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of Colored People headquarters in Tacoma, Washington The bombing of the Oklahoma City 
federal building in April 1995 and the derailment of the Amtrak train in Arizona in August 
1995 were allegedly commited by individuals who may have been associated with paramilitary 
right-wing groups 
Left-wing domestic terrorism is usually defined as being Marxist-Leninist in 
orientation. Groups such as the African National lljammu, the Dar-11 I Movement and the 
Amaru Allah Community are defined as being leftist in orientation. Many of the Puerto Rican 
terrorist groups such as the Armed Forces of National Liberation and the Macheteros also 
fall into this category. Left-wing terrorism has continued to decline over the past five years 
which may be due to the extensive number of arrests of the leftist groups' leaders during the 
1980s. 
Bands of right-wing militants, most calling themselves "militias" are becoming an 
increasing concern to the FBI. Although they have no centralized structure, there are linkages 
among some of them, consisting of sharing propaganda materials and speakers. 
The aims of these militias, often stated bellicosely, involve laying the groundwork for 
massive resistance to the federal government and its law enforcement agencies as well as 
opposition to gun control laws. According to the adherents, America's government is the 
main enemy (among others), constantly increasing authoritarian control and contemplating 
warfare against unsuspecting American citizens. Gun control legislation is the major strategy 
in a secret government conspiracy to disarm and control the American people and abolish 
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their Constitutional "right to bear arms."   The fear of government confiscation of their 
weapons is a paramount concern.62 
Although gun control is the primary concern of most of the militias, there is also a 
movement to turn back the clock on federal involvement in other issues such as education, 
abortion and the environment Some of the leaders are also known racists, religious bigots 
and/or political extremists In some northwest militia groups, for example, there are militia 
leaders with backgrounds in the Aryan Nations movement, Neo-Nazi groups and the Ku Klux 
Klan Currently, the Anti-Defamation League has found active militias in no fewer than 
thirteen states and even thought these militias seem to be primarily concerned with gun 
control, racist and anti-Semitic dialogue crops up more and more. 
Beginning in May, 1978, a series of bombing incidents have occurred across the 
United States for which there is no apparent explanation or motive. No person or group has 
been identified as the perpetrator(s) of these incidents. The explosions have taken place in 
eight states from Connecticut to California and, as a result of these bombings, three 
individuals have been killed and twenty-three injured. Between 1987 and 1993, these 
bombings stopped but that changed in June, 1993 when a well-known geneticist in California 
and a renown computer scientist at Yale University opened packages which had been mailed 
to them and were severely injured by the explosions that resulted Eighteen months later an 
advertising executive was killed in New Jersey followed by another explosion that killed a 
62Irwin Suall et al, Armed and Dangerous: Militias Take Aim at the Federal 
Government (Anti-Defamation League, 1994) pg. 2 
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timber industry lobbyist in Sacramento, California on 24 April 1995.   As of this date, the 
perpetrator(s) are still at large.63 
On February 10, 1995, a counterterrorism bill drafted by the Clinton Administration 
was introduced in the Senate and the House of Representatives There has been opposition 
to this bill based on several issues Some senators and representatives believe that this 
legislation would: 
1   Authorize the Justice Department (meaning the FBI) to pick and choose crimes to 
investigate and prosecute based on political beliefs and associations; 
2. Repeal the provision barring the U.S. military from civilian law enforcement; 
3. Expand a pre-trial detention scheme that puts the burden of proof on the accused; 
4   Loosen the carefully-crafted rules governing federal wiretaps, in violation of the 
Fourth Amendment, 
5. Establish special courts that would use secret evidence to order the deportation of 
persons convicted of no crimes, in violation of basic principles of due process; 
6. Permit permanent detention by the Attorney General of aliens convicted of crimes, 
with no judicial review; 
7. Give the President unreviewable power to criminalize fund-raising for lawful 
activities associated with unpopular causes; 
8   Renege on the Administration's approval in the last Congress of a provision to 
insure that the FBI would not investigate based on First Amendment activities, and 
"Department of Justice, UNA BOMB: Series of Unsolved Bombings (Internet, 
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9. Resurrect the discredited ideological visa denial provisions of the McCarran Walter 
Act to bar foreign speakers.64 
In the wake of the Oklahoma bombing, the Administration has pressed Congress to 
pass the counterterrorism bill but reluctance is still prominent. Despite this opposition, The 
New York Times reported the FBI recently proposed a national wiretapping system which 
would give law enforcement officials the capacity to monitor one of every one-hundred 
telephone lines in high-crime areas. Privacy rights advocates oppose this proposal, stating 
that this surveillance ability would far exceed the current needs of law enforcement officials 
around the country In recent years, these officials have conducted an annual average of less 
than eight-hundred fifty court authorized wiretaps or fewer than one in every 174,000 
telephone lines This plan would require Congressional approval (unlikely) and would still 
require a court warrant to conduct the wiretaps Privacy rights advocates fear a Big Brother 
surveillance capability might encourage law enforcement officials to use wiretapping much 
more frequently as an investigative tool63 
In a letter to Congressman Henry Hyde, the Chairman of the Committee on the 
Judiciary, Louis Freeh, the FBI director, rebutted this report. He reiterated that Congress did 
not expand the FBI's authority to conduct wiretaps nor did the FBI ask Congress to do so. 
64Center for National Security Studies, Clinton Terrorism Legislation Threatens 
Constitutional Rights (Internet, www.cnss.com, 1995), pg. 1 
65John Markoff, FBI Proposes Huge Wiretapping System, New York Times, 
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The new law requires the FBI, on behalf of all law enforcement, to work with the telephone 
industry to identify technical design requirements for industry to build into their systems. The 
FBI has not asked for the ability to monitor one out of every one-hundred telephone lines 
because it would be impossible to obtain that many court orders.66 
Other FBI officials have asserted that the FBI is severely restricted in infiltrating know 
extremist groups, that it has no terrorism data base like the Central Intelligence Agency's and 
that it i: powerless to stop extremist groups from masquerading as "religious groups". 
All of these claims are incorrect. The Smith guidelines, mentioned previously, make 
it absolutely clear that the FBI does not have to wait for blood in the streets before it can 
investigate a terrorist group The guidelines expressly state: "In its efforts to anticipate or 
prevent crimes, the FBI must at times initiate investigations in advance of criminal conduct."67 
E.        TRENDS 
The lack of domestic terrorist activity until 1995 can be explained as a response to 
world events Puerto Rican terrorism is dormant as a result of the political plebescite in which 
Puerto Ricans voted to remain a commonwealth This vote took the impetus out of the 
FALN's terrorist campaign for independence. Special interest terrorist groups, which include 
violent arms of environmental and animal rights activists, still remain a potential threat to U.S. 
66Louis J. Freeh sent this letter to Henry Hyde to explain how the New York 
Times had twisted the FBI's public notice, explaining their collaboration with the 
telephone industry. 
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interests   Criminal acts perpetrated against abortion services providers are currently being 
investigated by a DOJ Task Force to determine whether a conspiracy exists. 
Several international terrorist groups continue to maintain or increase their presence 
in the United States. These groups continue to infiltrate its members into the country via legal 
and illegal means. Despite their pronounced hatred for the United States and its policies, 
these groups perceive it as a fertile environment for fundraising and recruitment. They are 
aware of the open, innocent-until-proven-guilty nature of this country where criminals as well 
as victims have rights The Constitution provides them protection from government 
prosecution. 
Loosely-affiliated groups of radical terrorists, like the one comprised of individuals 
who conspired in the bombing of the World Trade Center, remain a primary concern to the 
FBI These groups are difficult to identify and do not easily conform to the rigid 
categorizations typically used by western law enforcement organizations. Radical terrorist 
groups could potentially avoid detection until they had carried out a terrorist act. 
Membership is fluid, with the leadership or chain of command not readily identifiable 
Until the World Trade Center bombing, international terrorist acts within the United 
States were rare and may remain so. That incident, however, shattered the illusion that the 




III. ISRAELI INTELLIGENCE AND DOMESTIC COUNTERTERRORISM 
A.        HISTORY OF DOMESTIC COUNTERTERRORISM IN ISRAEL 
In the last chapter, I discussed the FBI and the various domestic counterterrorist 
programs that have been implemented in earlier years In this chapter, I will be looking at 
what has been acknowledge as the world's foremost authority on domestic counterterrorism 
and security Long before Israel petitioned for independence in 1948, it was obvious to the 
British and the Arabs living in the area that a homeland was in the making for emigrating 
Jews To the British, this meant yet another inconvenience in a land of uncertainty and 
instability but to the Arabs living there, this was intolerable. 
Several terrorist incidents actually took place before Israel's statehood. On April 15, 
1936 several armed Palestinians blocked a road and stopped about twenty vehicles to demand 
money for weapons and ammunition One vehicle, a truck carrying crates of chickens to Tel 
Aviv, had a Jewish driver and a Jewish passenger. A third Jew was in another vehicle. For 
reasons known only to them, the Palestinians rounded up the three men and shot them, killing 
two and wounding the other.68 
The following day, two members of a well-established, dissident Zionist militia group, 
IrgimBet, drove to a farming shack east of Tel Aviv, knocked on the door and fired inside, 
killing one Arab and badly wounding another. The British police and Arabs assumed that the 
68Ian Black and Benny Morris, Israel's Secret Wars (New York: Grove 
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attack was retaliatory   "If the perpetrators had imagined that they would thus put an end to 
the bloodshed in Palestine, they were very soon to be disappointed "69 
As that week progressed, unrest and instability became the norm. Funerals turned into 
angry demonstrations, the Jewish Sabbath became a free-for-all for Jewish thugs to assault 
Arabs, and rumors became tacit permission for causing more violence By the standards of 
both earlier and later conflicts in the Middle East, this kind of violence and bloodshed was 
minor but it was a portent of things to come Arabs were fearful of the expansionist nature 
of Zionist enterprise while Zionist land purchases continued in the wave of Jewish 
immigration that began after Hitler became Germany's chancellor 
On 19 April, four days after the ambush by the Palestinians, life in the Tel Aviv area 
returned to normal. Hundreds of Jews went to their offices and businesses in Jaffa. Then 
trouble started with a rumor: three Syrian laborers and a local Arab woman had been killed 
in Tel Aviv It was not true but by nine o'clock that morning, large crowds of Arabs had 
gathered outside the government offices demanding the bodies of the "victims " Many Jews 
were stabbed or beaten up, although many were given shelter in Arab homes and still others 
managed to get back to Tel Aviv via water transportation In the ensuing melee, the British 
managed to quell the disturbance but two Arabs and nine Jews were killed A state of 
emergency was declared by the British authority 70 
^Phillip Knightly, The Second Oldest Profession (London: 1986), pg. 36. 
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The Haganah militia operated a semi-clandestine arm which was a collection of 
volunteers conducting somewhat amateurish intelligence for the Histadrut labor federation. 
Obviously, they were not in the right place before the Jaffa riots or they neglected to see the 
signs. The Jews were shocked by the timing and strength of the Arab opposition. 
Unfortunately for those that died, the Haganah intelligence officers had seen no reason to 
report movements they had monitored around the main Jaffa mosque. 
Immediately after the riots, Arabs began attacking Jews all over the country both in 
cities and isolated areas Arab stevedores went on strike which crippled Jaffa's port. This 
went on for several months but the Jews did not retaliate physically, choosing instead the 
diplomatic and political route They tried to convince the British to crack down on the 
perpetrators They also attempted to persuade the Palestine government that they were 
dealing with criminals and not a politically inspired rebellion All of this was to no avail 
because the strike and the violence in Jaffa continued 
By now, events had finally convinced the Haganah that security was now an 
overriding concern The intelligence division recruited Jews who had extensive Arab contacts 
to gather information. They believed that human intelligence (HUMINT) was the best way 
to develop an intelligence base on the activities of Arabs co-existing with Jews so that they 
would not continue to be caught unaware by dissident Palestinians The Haganah policy was 
now "know the enemy "71 
71Black and Morris, pg. 7. 
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The Jewish HUMINT sources were mostly merchants, farmers and land developers 
Because they had many Arab contacts in their day-to-day endeavors, they also had the 
opportunity to converse about Arab activities and perspectives. They were also able to 
recruit reliable Arab sources. These Arabs were not necessarily interested in money for these 
services but revenge. Most of them had been persecuted by other Arabs because of ties of 
commerce and real estate sales to Jews and so they had strong personal reasons for wanting 
to neutralize or get rid of those persecutors They expected the J vs to offer them refuge 
when they were attacked or even defense of their homes. The Jews took advantage of this 
dependence and were able to build reliable, complete dossiers on dissident Arabs n 
At the same time, the Political Department of the Haganah tried various means to 
foment dissension within the enemy camp through bribery and disinformation. By this time, 
eighty Jewish lives had been lost in the violence and it was clear that intelligence work was 
becoming increasingly important. Ezra Danin, one of the first and best intelligence operatives, 
wrote a memorandum to the head of the Haganah outlining how modern intelligence work 
should be organized.   He argued that 
"the attacks against us appeared to begin spontaneously and because we were 
unprepared we suffered many casualties at the start. Since the government is either 
also uninformed or does not want to crush the trouble we must find a solution by 
setting up our own Haganah intelligence service The intelligence work must be 
carried out all the time, even when things are quiet, as happens in every country. 
Thus we will be able to predict and perhaps prevent future outbreaks."73 
72Ibid., pg 8 
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He believed that lists should be maintained on Arab clubs, organizations and political activists 
including their addresses, car license numbers, and the names of friends and relatives. Arab 
groups should be infiltrated and information should be exploited to create internal strife 
By 1938, the Arabs were engaging in a full-fledged revolt against the Zionists. The 
Jews were constantly haranguing the British to punish those rebels involved in the attack so 
that they would be deterred but to no avail. The Arabs were very successful, capturing areas 
and regularly attacking police stations An eccentric British officer, Charles Wingate 
developed Special Night Squads (SNS) composed of a mixed force of British soldiers and 
Haganah volunteers to fight back and eventually, they were as successful as the Arab rebels. 
The SNS accomplishments encouraged the Haganah to be bolder, to use night ambushes and 
to go out and meet their Arab enemy on his own ground in a preemptive attack. Even after 
this British officer had been reassigned, the Haganah continued these activities and became 
quite efficient. 
By 1939, the Arab rebellion was waning. Their leader, Abdel-Rahim al-Haj 
Muhammad, was killed by the British army in a Samarian village and rebel gangs had no 
stomach to fight anymore They fled to Syria and the Palestinians left behind were deeply 
divided without leadership Although this was a great military coup for the Zionists, 
diplomatically, it was disastrous. The British government decided against partitioning off 
Palestine and severely restricted Jewish immigration and land sales to Jews. British 
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authorities, intending to crack down, arrested Hagcmah members.  They were particularly 
interested in the activities of Jewish fishermen who were involved in illegal immigration.74 
The make-shift intelligence system of the Haganah had to be rearranged after these 
arrests The national command set up a counter-espionage department which monitored Jews 
who collaborated with the British and the right-wing dissidents of the Irgun Jewish 
communists were also under surveillance By 1940, a joint country-wide intelligence service, 
Sherut Yediot or the Shai, was formed and all of the various intelligence departments of the 
Haganah were placed under their auspices The Shai was the first formal intelligence 
organization formed by the Zionists. 
By 1946, the Zionists were fully aware that a full-scale war with the Arabs was 
imminent. The Allies had liberated the Nazi death camps in Europe and were under intense 
moral pressure to grant the Jews a homeland of their own Finally the British, impelled by the 
United States, stopped trying to halt Jewish immigration into the area and turned it over to 
the United Nations. The United Nations General Assembly appointed a Special Commission 
on Palestine which recommended that the British withdraw and that the country be partitioned 
into separate Jewish and Arab states. These recommendations were endorsed by the General 
Assembly and it was accepted by the Jews Palestinian Arabs and neighboring Arab states, 
however, rejected the proposal outright. 
74 Black and Morris, pg. 16 
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Hostilities perpetrated by Arabs against Jews were sporadic at first and the Haganah 
did nothing because they believed this to be an initial wave of anger that would pass. When 
the violence continued and then escalated, the Haganah became aggressively defensive, 
occasionally launching massive retaliatory strikes on Arab villages harboring armed rebels. 
The Arabs brought in "volunteers" which included soldiers from the Iraqi, Syrian, and 
Jordanian armies. They reinforced the Palestinian irregulars and assisted in large-scale attacks 
against outlying Jewish settlements The British were now concerned about withdrawing with 
as few casualties as possible so their interference was minimal. 
The Haganah took advantage of the British lack of concern and went on the 
offensive, capturing the large Arab centers in Haifa, Tiberias, Jaffa and parts of Jerusalem. 
This triggered the largest exodus of the Palestinian Arabs and by the time the establishment 
of Israel was announced, approximately three-hundred thousand Arabs had fled Palestine. 
When the war ended, there were approximately seven-hundred thousand refugees in various 
Arab states.75 
The Shai was ill-prepared for the war because its activities had involved political 
intelligence rather than military intelligence. David Ben-Gurion, Israel's first prime minister, 
believed that they lacked "direction and systematic thinking."76 Although they had made 
considerable improvements since their inception and they exhibited increasing professionalism, 
"Black and Morris, pg. 38. 
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the Shai remained a part-time, amateur intelligence service They were totally unaware of the 
coming war with the Arabs, even though all events made this the inevitable conclusion. The 
Shai's manpower and energies were still committed to keeping tabs on Jewish Communists 
and right-wing dissidents such as the Irgun and the Stem Gang 
The Shai 's failure to warn the Haganah of Syria's military deployments along the 
border and its mist ken anticipation of Arab rioting prompted Ben Gurion to set up a 
committee of inquiry. They concluded that the Arab informants were losing their value and 
better, more well-placed informants were needed in Lebanon, Egypt, Syria and Jordan. After 
the fact, when the Palestinians and the Israelis were well into the war, the Shai decided it was 
time to determine the nature and aims of enemy operations. They decided wiretapping would 
be the best method to gather intelligence and had an entire network set up. This method was 
imminently successful and more than made up for their past inadequacies. In fact, they 
upstaged military intelligence by accurately predicting the numbers, routes and objectives of 
the Arab Legion and the Iraqis In general, however, all the intelligence organizations had 
failed to gather intelligence that was useful to the Zionist cause. The Haganah operations 
branch felt they had a "fundamental intelligence blindness" and could not plan effectively.77 
Ben-Gurion was aware that the ir -elligence apparatus had to be reformed and there 
must be a clear separation between military and political intelligence The Shai was 
dismantled and its functions evolved into several new bodies under the Sherut HaModi 'in or 
77 Black and Morris, pg. 54 
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the Intelligence Defense Service. By 1949, it consisted of eleven departments and this 
structure was maintained for ten years. He also created what he called an "internal Shaf\ the 
General Security Service {Shenit HaBitachon HaKali) or Shin Bet. All of these came under 
the auspices of the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) Intelligence Service 
Until 1950, the Shin Bet (which is equivalent to the FBI in the United States) 
remained administratively within the framework of the IDF which provided cover, services, 
military ranks and pay The head of the Shin Bet at that time, Isser Harel, felt that the new 
state of Israel needed a purely civilian security service because the military was providing 
minimal protection anyway In early 1950, a compromise was reached and the Shin Bet came 
under the Defense Ministry and then later it became autonomous reporting directly to the 
prime minister. 
The Shin Bet was responsible for routine physical security of classified information 
and of government and defense establishment premises from the beginning. Their most 
important work, however, involved counterespionage and domestic subversion, with 
particular attention devoted to Israel's Arab minority. 
Arab Communists and their links outside the country were an early priority. The Shin 
Bet accurately perceived the internal Arab danger and lobbied heavily for continued Israeli 
military rule in Arab areas for security reasons The cease-fire line with the Jordanian West 
Bank was long, ill-defined and ill protected and just beyond it lived hundreds of thousands of 
refugees Whenever Arab spies were captured, they were portrayed in a sensationalist and 
demonic light   This was an attempt by the Shin Bet to make Israeli citizens aware of what 
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was in their midst and, therefore, to offer help in the form of HUMINT Many Jewish 
immigrants from Arab countries were constantly followed and they reported that they had 
been offered money by Arabs to spy for hostile intelligence services, especially the Jordanians. 
After Israel's stunning and totally unexpected victory in the Six-Day War which began 
on June 5, 1967, they realized that they were unprepared for its consequences. By June 10, 
with the West Bank, East Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip under full Israeli control, one of the 
first tasks they had to undertake was to work out how they were going to control a large anu 
hostile Arab population. The Shin Bet, Mossad ana Aman (military intelligence) were aware 
that there were going to be terrorists in their midst and one intelligence operative defined the 
main security goal: "To isolate the terrorist from the general population and deny him shelter 
and assistance even though the natural sympathy ofthat population is with the terrorists and 
not the Israeli administration "7S 
This new intelligence threat required the three Israeli intelligence organizations add 
new duties to their operations Aman retained its overall responsibility for national 
intelligence and set collection and research priorities for the two other main components of 
the intelligence community. The Shin Bet was given control of operational intelligence in the 
occupied territories and the Mossad was ordered to increase its targeting and penetration of 
Palestinian organizations abroad. 
78 Shlov -o Gazit, HaGezer VeHaMakel (Tel Aviv, 1985), pg. 291 
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The Shin Bet was not prepared for the task it faced. Although their reserve 
manpower, particularly their Arab speakers, had been mobilized, it was quite some time 
before those and the new recruits were trained enough for an operational deployment. "The 
service just wasn't ready to take over such a large area and such a large number of people. 
Our only previous experience was in the Gaza Strip in 1956, and we assumed that the same 
would happen, that it would all be over and we'd be leaving in a few months," a senior Shin 
Bet officer revealed.79 
The Shin Bet had developed into a highly professional security and counterespionage 
organization whose two main tasks had been the control of the Arab minority and countering 
the threat of hostile foreign intelligence operations on Israeli soil The closure of all Soviet 
Bloc embassies after the rupture of diplomatic relations in 1967 had freed some of the 
service's counterintelligence personnel for other duties 
For the first few weeks after the end of hostilities, the Palestinians were still existing 
in a state of shock By July, however, the Shin Bet had received indications that shock had 
finally given way to anger and there were signs of readiness to begin a campaign of civil 
disobedience organized by the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) against the 
occupation authorities. One factor contributing to their anger was the large number of Israelis 
who started to go out and see the sights their new territory had to offer and hunt for bargains 
in the souks of East Jerusalem and Hebron 
79Black and Morris, pg 238 in an interview with this individual. 
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Fatah, a Palestinian militant splinter group which had operated in Jordan and had not 
participated in the war, began to stir up rebellion.  Their military wing announced: 
"Our organization has decided to continue struggling against the Zionist conqueror. 
We are planning to operate far from the Arab states so they will not suffer Israeli 
reprisals for fedayeen actions It will therefore be impossible to hold the Arab people 
responsible for our war. Our organization is the organization of the Palestinian 
people and we are united in our resolve to free our stolen homeland from the hands 
of the Zionists.'180 
These words projected more confidence and preparation than the Palestinians possessed to 
conduct the guerrilla operations they envisioned Approximately five-hundred volunteers 
went through three-week military and ideological training courses at Fatah camps in Syria, 
after being screened by a "security committee" to ensure they were not Israeli agents These 
crash courses were not enough, however, and the Fatah security screen was also totally 
useless 
When the first fedayeen entered the West Bank and Gaza Strip, they were often 
careless about concealing their tracks and identities Having operated in Jordan and Egypt 
and dealing with the ruthless efficiency of their security services had made it difficult for the 
Palestinian national movement to build up an infrastructure before the war. Early operations 
were amateurish and the organizational cells were too large. Yasir Arafat, chairman of the 
PLO, and his deputies attributed these setbacks to: "the efficiency of the Israeli secret services 
and the carelessness of our fighters."81 
Ze'er Schiff and Raphael Rothstein, Fedayeen (New York, 1972), pg. 63. 
'Abu Iyad and Eric Rouleau, My Home, My Land (London, 1978), pg 56. 
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Arafat himself arrived in the West Bank at that time and set up headquarters He was 
impatient and pressed for immediate action when it would have been more prudent to 
establish bases and garner gradual support. As it was, he did little more than test the waters 
by conferring with supporters and raise morale. He eventually was forced to flee the area 
disguised as a woman after the Shin Bet had discovered his safe house 
These victorious beginnings made the Shin Bel a powerful security force with whom 
the PLO had to deal. They had the advantage of putting their counterterrorist plans into 
action while Fatah was in the first stage of organization before the onset of sabotage 
operations Although the Shin Bet's successes were not well-known to Israelis due to 
military censors, the Palestinians were well aware of their exploits and lived in fear. The other 
Israeli intelligence services began to respect the Shin Bet's professionalism and close 
cooperation resulted, making Fatah 's exploits less successful. One security officer said of 
Shin Bet, "The big change was that we were no longer just collecting intelligence We went 
operational in our own right."82 
From the outset, the Shin Bet proved that it was adept at dealing with classic domestic 
terrorism. For example, a well-known Fatah cell operating in Jerusalem area was arrested 
quickly after an explosion at the Fast Hotel in September 1967 and an abortive bomb attempt 
at the crowded Zion Square cinema in October 1967. No one was injured, but the cinema 
attack set a dangerous and worrying precedent; this was the first time Palestinians had tried 
82Black and Morris, pg. 243. 
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to attack a purely civilian target The head of this cell had recruited about thirty people, most 
of whom had been trained in Syria Many were also members of Jerusalem's African 
community, descendants of Muslim pilgrims 
Two young African women were arrested immediately after the cinema bomb attempt 
and in no time, the Shin Bet had a lead The two women were amateurs Under light 
interrogation, they gave everything away, providing the Shm Bet with the names of their 
comrades, their whereabouts, precise information about their training in Syria, their infiltration 
routes and the organization of other cells in the West Bank. Within forty-eight hours the 
entire cell had been rounded up and the Shin Bet had uncovered arms, explosives and 
vehicles.83 
By the end of the first year of occupation the West Bank was relatively quiet, but 
there was always work to be done The Shin Bet estimated that there were still between one- 
hundred and two-hundred Palestinian activists hiding in the collection of houses built around 
the narrow alleyways of the old Casbah in the Palestinian dominated town of Nablus. They 
feared that if the core of the fedayeen was not broken up, they would be able to train and 
organize uninterrupted, improving their guerrilla tactics The Israeli government, specifically, 
Moshe Dayan, the defense minister, was reluctant to roust a community and disturb their 
peace unless the Shin Bet could guarantee that they were sure of their suspects. When a 
Palestinian was assassinated for collaborating with the Israelis, Dayan gave the go-ahead   The 
3Meron Benveniste, Jerusalem, the Torn City (Jerusalem, 1976), pg. 218. 
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Shin Bet rounded up thousands of Palestinian men living in the Casbah and paraded them in 
front of masked informants. When all was said and done, the Shin Bet found two arms caches 
and arrested seventy-four people who were identified as guerrillas.*4 
Although initially, Fatah had announced they would not be operating in Arab states, 
that philosophy changed as the Shin Bet became more adept at sniffing them out and escape 
was imperative. Often, those terrorists that fled the Shin Bet raids would cross the river back 
into Jordan, which forced the Israelis to conduct reprisal raids on Jordanian army positions. 
This naturally increased the strain between King Hussein of Jordan and the Palestinians. 
The Shin Bet also used infiltration effectively. "A special effort was made to plant 
informers in terrorist bases in Jordan and to infiltrate them into networks operating inside 
Israeli-administered territories." one security expert wrote later.85 The Palestinians believed 
that penetration was extensive and they worried about it constantly but did not have the 
power or the expertise to stop it or put it to use They tried to claim that they had many 
double agents operating for them but Israeli sources insisted that these claims were false or 
at least vastly exaggerated. The Shin Bet insisted there were no known PLO penetrations of 
their operations 
Exploitation of Palestinian suspicions was also a successful technique used by the Shin 
Bet.   They would "casually" mention a "collaborator" in front of a prisoner during an 
84Shabtai Teveth, The Cursed Blessing (London, 1970), pg 235 
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interrogation and then release or deport him In many cases, the freed Palestinian would 
denounce his colleagues as traitors, fueling the already intense fear of Israeli penetration and 
creating internal purges via "remote control."86 
PLO factions were incredibly naive during the early days of their terrorist operations. 
During the training process, they obviously did not instill loyalty in their volunteers, which 
made the Shin Bet's job that much easier One captured terrorist could do immense damage 
to a cell. The Shin Bet would take a captive, dress him up in an IDF uniform and dark glasses 
and take a tour of the West Bank. As they traversed the area from north to south, the 
terrorist would point out people with whom he had trained. Massive arrests would follow 
which, in turn, would increase Palestinian suspicions of Israeli penetration. 
An unwitting ally of the Shin Bet was Jordan. The PLO claimed that Israeli 
penetration was responsible for the confrontations between the Palestinians and the Jordanian 
army but it was their own arrogance that infuriated King Hussein. He was unable to accept 
the creation of an independent Palestinian state within his own kingdom. When the Popular 
Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) hijacked three international airliners and set them 
down in a desert airfield in Jordan, the Shin Bet informed them that their relatives (measuring 
in the hundreds) were being held hostage pending the outcome of this terrorist act. The 
passengers were released unharmed and the aircraft were blown up.87 
Steven Eytan, The Eye of Tel Aviv (Paris: 1972), pg 72. 
87This account of the hijacking appeared in HaAretz, an Israeli newspaper on 11 
July 1985 
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King Hussein responded to these actions by turning his army on the Palestinians, 
thousands of whom were annihilated This became known among the Palestinians as Black 
September. Scores offedayeen fled from the East Bank after another confrontation with the 
Jordanian army and seventy-two surrendered to the Israelis rather than face a bloody 
confrontation Those who were extremely grateful to still be alive were used by the Israelis 
to contact and identify other groups, who were then rounded up by the Shin Bet. 
In the Gaza Strip, which was much more densely populated with Palestinians, the Shin 
Bet had a much more difficult time isolating PLO and PFLP terrorists. In this area, the 
terrorists were more firmly entrenched and the appalling physical conditions under which the 
refugees had to live made them more sympathetic to the rebel cause Eventually, the Shin Bet 
had to work closely with the Israeli army. An elite commando unit was ordered to comb the 
area until every terrorist was found In the refugee camps, adult males were randomly 
stopped and searched; curfews were imposed on the camps; and the army was supplied 
regularly with a list of wanted terrorists Before the army assisted the Shin Bet, there were 
thirty-four terrorist incidents recorded by July, 1971. By December ofthat same year, only 
one terrorist incident had occurred The Shin Bet-Army cooperation was highly effective. 
The massacre of eleven Israeli athletes in Munich was a blot on the Shin Bet record 
and a severe blow to the image they had built up with their successes in Israel The security 
of the athletes was their responsibility while any intelligence information on Palestinian 
terrorist activities was the responsibility of the Mossad According to the Mossad chief, his 
organization had received intelligence about a PLO unit flying in from the Middle East to 
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somewhere in Europe and had passed it to the Shin Bet The Shin Bet argued that the report 
was vague almost to the point of uselessness. An inquiry into the security lapse led to the 
dismissal of three senior Shin Bet executives. Golda Meir, the prime minister, felt that this 
would help to restore confidence in the security service 88 
The relative success of the Shin Bet after the Six-Day War prevented the Palestinians 
from launching a people's war at the very moment their ideology required it. The occupied 
territories never became Algeria or Vietnam as envisioned by the PLO The Israelis were able 
to construct a security system based on the "carrot and stick" method which turned out to be 
a fruitful gambit. Although the Shin Bel was successful, this forced the Palestinian terrorists 
to operate abroad, which was much more difficult for the Mossad to handle without the 
backing of the Israeli army. 
B.        ISRAELI COUNTERTERRORISM (1980 - 1989) 
Although the Shin Bet was acknowledged, internationally, as the premier domestic 
security service, it was certainly not without its share of scandal and corruption They had 
developed their craft over a period of more than a decade and had become very adept at 
flushing out terrorists and preventing most terrorist activities within Israel and the occupied 
territories. It might be said that the scandals erupted at this time because the intelligences 
services of Israel were attempting to stay on top of their game in a changing world 
"Black and Morris, pg. 271. 
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Palestinian terrorists were beginning to catch up with Israeli intelligence methods and it was 
becoming more difficult for those agencies to stay on top of the Palestinians. 
The first Shin Bet scandal began on April 12, 1984. Four teenage Palestinians from 
the Gaza Strip boarded the number 300 bus in Tel Aviv, en route to the southern town of 
Ashkelon. About halfway through the journey, one of the thirty-five passengers, who had 
somehow become suspicious of the four Arabs and their intentions and had tried in vain to 
warn the driver of his fears, jumped off the bus shouting: "Terrorists, terrorists!"89   One of 
the Palestinians threatened the bus driver with a knife and a hand grenade   A second hijacker 
brandished some kind of spray can.  The third took up a position in the center of the bus, 
holding a briefcase from which wires were protruding and the fourth said he had a grenade. 
They informed the passengers that they had no quarrel with them and allowed a pregnant 
woman passenger to disembark. She alerted the police and roadblocks were set up but the 
bus continued   A few miles south of Gaza City, soldiers shot out the rear tires of the bus 
which brought it to a standstill. The driver escaped and was beaten by soldiers who mistook 
him for one of the hijackers. 
By the time the defense minister was informed, an elite army unit was in position 
around the bus awaiting orders. The head of the Shin Bet, Avraham Shalom, his deputy and 
five other Shin Bet field operatives and executives were also present. Negotiations began 
with the first hijacker who was still standing by the driver's seat. He demanded to see the 
89' This account was taken from the newspaper Ma 'ariv on 18 July 1986 
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Egyptian ambassador and the immediate release of five-hundred Palestinian prisoners 
Several journalists and photographers had appeared by then to record the event. 
At dawn the next day, soldiers stormed the bus The first and second hijacker were 
killed and most of the passengers had thrown themselves to the floor The other two 
hijackers were overpowered and badly beaten to stun them When they were brought off the 
bus, they were questioned by Brigadier General Yitzhak Mordechai, commander of the elite 
unit. By his own admission, he pistol whipped them to get answers to his various questions. 
Although the hijackers were dazed, they were very much alive when handed over to the Shin 
Bet. As they were lead away to a nearby wheat field, photographers recorded the .-vent on 
film. 
Israel Radio reported that two terrorists had been killed in the assault and two others 
captured. Later that day, however, in response to repeated questioning by journalists, an IDF 
spokesman said that two terrorists had been killed in the storming of the bus and that the two 
others had died on their way to the hospital in Ashkelon. Doubts began to emerge about the 
truth of the official statements. The Jerusalem correspondent for the New York Times ignored 
the military censor restrictions and reported suspicions that the two living hijackers had been 
killed after their capture. Other media and the IDF were also very confused, the defense 
ministry ordered an inquiry into the affair 
Against better judgement, the defense ministry allowed the Shin Bet to appoint their 
own man to represent the security service on the board of inquiry. The Shin Bet insisted that 
this was to prevent friction between them and the army   Later on, however, it was apparent 
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that the Shin Bet member on the board of inquiry was passing details of the investigation back 
to Avraham Shalom, the director of Shin Bet. With this information, the Shin Bet was able 
to work out a cover-up 
After the autopsy was completed, the board published its report They found that 
both terrorists had died of fractured skulls and that unspecified members of the "security 
forces" had committed crimes. The Shin Bet witnesses described to the investigators how 
they saw General Mordechai standing in front of a kneeling terrorist and kicking him in the 
head. Others said that he had used his pistol like "a hammer." Essentially, the Shin Bet had 
agreed to set up Mordechai as the prime suspect. The witnesses were briefed by GSS legal 
advisers before appearing in front of the inquiry and were ordered to report back to 
headquarters afterwards to describe what had happened. It was a very professional cover-up 
Mordechai realized he was being framed and, because of his popularity, was able to 
find witnesses who contradicted those of the Shin Bet. Nine soldiers described how Shin Bet 
agents had sealed off the wheat field while dealing with the hijackers. They reported what 
happened as an "organized lynch " Unfortunately, this did not help because, although there 
was insufficient evidence to charge Mordechai with the killings, it was recommended that he, 
five Shin Bet men and three policemen be tried for assault. A special disciplinary court 
acquitted all 
The deputy of the Shin Bet demanded the resignation of Shalom. He approached 
Shimon Peres, who was the prime minister, and offered to tender his resignation if that is 
what it took to obtain Shalom's removal.  Peres refused and the deputy took the demand 
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outside the service to the attorney-general, Yitzhak Zamir. The attorney-general and his aides 
cross-examined the deputy for days and was finally convinced of the truth 
Israel Television reported on May 1986 that Professor Zamir intended to prosecute 
a "very senior official in a very sensitive state service " That person was named the next day 
as Avraham Shalom and it became public knowledge in Israel that the head of Shin Bet was 
accused of withholding information about the killings, putting pressure on witnesses and 
tampering with evidence.90 
Shalom knew ultimately that he had to go and he resigned on June 26 after it was 
announced that he and three other officials had been granted pardons by President Chaim 
Herzog. Later, when a new attorney-general was installed, the police forwarded their findings 
of the case, including the statements of thirty-nine witnesses. This report made it clear 
beyond a doubt that the two hijackers were killed on Shalom's orders Shalom claimed he 
gave orders based on a conversation with Shamir in November 1983, in which the treatment 
of captured terrorists was discussed. Shamir informed the police that he remembered the 
meeting but "looking back, I must say that could not be understood as permission to take 
prisoners, question them and then kill them." The Justice Ministry team concluded that 
Shamir had not known of the order to kill the terrorists or of the subsequent cover-up. 
90 Black and Morris, pg. 407. 
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Because Shalom and the other players had already been pardoned, the attorney general 
decided that the case was closed.91 
Other scandals followed but the Shin Bet was able to weather them By the end of 
the decade, their high-profile approach and considerable successes in dealing with the intifada 
endeared them once again to the Israelis As the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza 
Strip tired of their long struggle and the human and economic sacrifices it required, the 
character of the unrest changed. The mass stone-throwing demonstrations gave way to hit- 
and-run attacks by small groups of activists. This kind of activity was on what the Shin Beth 
had cut its teeth The Palestinian activists were organized in classic cell-like structures with 
which the Shin Bet was thoroughly familiar.92 
Operating closely with the army, Shin Bet agents track down and killed or captured 
the members of two small Fatah-a.ffilia.ted armed groups. They had also arrested hundreds 
of members of the military wing of the Hammas movement in the Gaza Strip. Some 
Palestinians argued that this was no great coup because Hammas members were not used to 
operating clandestinely and therefore were an easy target 
C.        ISRAELI COUNTERTERRORISM (1990s) 
Early in this decade, the Shin Bet showed that it was able to hold its own with it long- 
tried modus operandi   It also helped that the intifada was having bad luck, suffering blow 
91Black and Morris, pg. 409. 
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after blow to its cause In May, 1990, after an abortive seaborne attack on the Israeli coast 
by the Palestine Liberation Front, the United States halted its dialogue with the PLO, robbing 
the organization of its greatest political achievement. This coincided with the collapse of the 
Labor-Likud national unity coalition and its replacement with a new right-wing Likud 
government. This was yet another blow to the legitimacy of the Palestinian's cause as Likud 
was well-known for their stand against Palestinian autonomy. When Iraq invade Kuwait in 
August, Palestinians enthusiastically supported Saddam Hussein. Being on the side of the 
defeated caused them political and economic damage, hurt their dialogue with the Israeli left 
(their only hope in Israel), and halted vital financial support from Arab countries who had 
stood against Iraq's invasion 93 
All this made life easier for the Shin Bel. They were spurred by the conviction that 
internal security had to be maintained so that Israel could negotiate from a strong position on 
the future of the West Bank and Gaza Strip 
D.        THE ASSASSINATION OF YITZHAK RABIN 
Although the Shin Bet began its counterterrorism operation with Jewish right wing 
groups, the rise of the Palestinian terrorists took precedence. Right wing groups were 
watched but largely ignored. Violent, hate-filled Jewish groups have been part of the political 
landscape since the Six-Day War   Their platform is based on the fact that the Sinai, West 
93 Black and Morris, pg 496 
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Bank, Gaza Strip and Golan Heights must be retained as part of Israel's biblical birthright by 
violence if necessary. Any Jew who opposes them is a traitor to cause.94 
Although many right wing groups have existed since the founding of the Israeli state 
(Irgim, Stem Gang), the most violent has been Kach (Thus), founded by American-born Meir 
Kahane (who also founded the Jewish Defense League) Kahane's rhetoric was so flammable, 
in 1983 a lone right-winger threw a grenade into a crowd of Peace Now ralliers, killing one 
Israeli man He based this action on encouragement from Kahane's speeches It was the first 
time in a long time that a Jew had used violence against fellow Jews for political reasons. 
Although Kach has diminished in influence, it still creates trouble. The group often 
makes telephone threats against journalists and politicians and takes responsibility for any 
violent act against Arabs Only after Kach devotee Baruch Goldstein sprayed a Hebron 
mosque with automatic-rifle fire in 1994, killing twenty-nine worshipers, did the Shin Bet 
begin to concentrate   more fully on violent right-wing groups. 
On November 4, 1995, Yitzhak Rabin, the prime minister of Israel, was assassinated 
by Yigal Amir, a law student, during a peace rally Amir and his conspirators have been 
linked to Eyal, a Kach offshoot. This group is based at Tel Aviv's Bar Ilan University and 
although its activities have usually tended toward threats and harassment rather than outright 
94Michael D. Lemonick, Roots of Israeli Extremism, Time, November 13, 1995, 
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violence, they tend to believe that any act, including murder, is justified if it thwarts the peace 
process.95 
Immediately after the assassination, the Shin Bet began a thorough investigation into 
events that were connected to the operation in all its stages. After the data were gathered, 
the Director decided to establish an internal investigation committee which would expand the 
investigation and the inquiry into the circumstances. The members of this committee were 
three former Shin Bet division heads who had retired at least ten years ago: Uzi Berger, 
former head of the Shin Bet Operations Division, Savinoam Avivi, previously head of the Shm 
Bet Protection Division, and Kafi Malka, who served as heads of Shin Bet Operations 
division, Administration Division and Protection Division in Europe.96 
The Internal Committee was asked in its letter of appointment to examine the 
following issues and the responsibility of the chain of command for these issues: 
1   The preparations for the operation 
2. The intelligence for the event 
3. The coordination of the intelligence with security inputs 
4. Coordination with the various elements that took part in the responsibility for 
providing security for the event: police, police anti-terror unit, hospital and others 
5. Performance of the unit during the event while emphasizing its performance during 
the assassination itself and during the evacuation of the Prime Minister.97 
95Lemonick, pg 2. 
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The committee was given full access to all the material that it requested and allowed 
to interview those persons it thought relevant to the event They worked continuously from 
November 5 to November 8 and submitted these conclusions to the Director of the Shin Bet. 
1 Planning failure: the committee points to a failure in planning in that a critical 
segment of the security operation for the event—and the professionalism appropriate 
for its security—was not taken into account 
2. Operational failure: the planning failure led to an operational failure in the security 
of this same critical segment. During the event, the planning failure was discerned and 
a number of directives were given to correct the deficiencies that remained in the 
critical segment The directives were partial, and were issued late. Their 
implementation as well was not complete 
3 As a result of the planning and security deficiencies and mainly due to the failure 
to correct the holes, the murderer succeeded in approaching the Prime Minister to 
within a lethal distance. 
4. The committee found that the bodyguard, who jumped on the murderer and did 
not fire at him, had exercised correct judgement, given the circumstances, a 
comparative run-through of firing a bullet, and field conditions. The committee 
commended the performance of the bodyguard, who was wounded during the event. 
5. The committee was not asked to examine—and therefore did not relate to—the 
performance of the police and did not deal with issues related to the prevention of 
incitement, et cetera as being relevant to the event. 
6. The committee pointed to the direct responsibility of three persons: the head of the 
Government Unit for VIP Protection, the head of the Operations Branch and the 
commander for the event. The committee recommended that the Director of the Shin 
Bet draw the necessary conclusions regarding those who were responsible for the 
failure and its occurrence. 
7 The committee found that the head of the Protection Division bears the 
responsibility for the system's poor functioning. The protection plan was presented 
to him, during his visit at the event and during the event itself, he pinpointed a number 
of deficiencies and ordered that they be corrected   The deficiencies were corrected 
late and incompletely.98 
The Director of the Shin Bet decided to recommend to Acting Prime Minister Shimon 
Peres that the head of the Protection Division, the head of the Government VIP Protection 
Unit, the head of the unit's Operations Branch and the commander for the event be suspended 
until all the examinations related to the tragic incident are completed, including a state 
commission of inquiry should it be decided to establish one 
Acting Prime Minister Peres approved the Director's decisions Later, the Director 
met with those heads of the divisions mention previously and told them of the committee's 
report and its conclusions and about his decision to suspend them immediately until all the 
investigations are completed. The head of the Protection Division then asked to resign from 
the Shin Bet and his resignation was accepted Other Shin Bet officials were appointed to fill 
in for those who were suspended or resigned and appropriate measures were taken to ensure 
the Shin Bet's operational capability while implementing the lessons learned. 
The Director of the Shin Bet then convened the entire organization and presented to 
them the committee's conclusions and the decisions he had made in their wake. He discussed 
the future of the Shin Bet and noted the immediate successful deployment of the largest 
protection operation ever in Israel which had occurred over the previous forty-eight hours. 
The Director emphasized the Shin Bet \s obligation to continue to defend the State of Israel 
in
 Report of Internal GSS Committee on Rabin Assassination, 8 November 1995 
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and its leaders and ministers against Arab and Jewish terrorism which continues to threaten 
Israel. 
On November 21, 1995, it was announced that Amir had once worked as a security 
guard abroad and had been trained by the Shin Bet. An accomplice, Avaishi Raviv, was an 
informer (and an alleged agenl provocateur) who was secretly reporting to the Shin Bet while 
reportedly handing out fliers of Rabin dressed as a Nazi SS officer. Yossi Melman, an 
intelligence expert stated, "there was a colossal failure of the General Security Service which 
led to Rabin's assassination. They had many tips and leads about Amir's intention to murder 
the prime minister and they ignored them." This information has shifted the focus of blame 
away from right wing extremists to the failures of the Shin Bet" 
Although recent events have thrown the Shin Bet into an unfavorable light, history has 
shown that they have been supremely effective in fighting domestic terrorism. In the future, 
they will have more on which to concentrate and it will be necessary to distrust Jews and 
Arabs. In today's world climate, anyone can be a terrorist in Israel and the Shin Bet is up to 
the challenge 
"This information was taken from a report filed by CNN Jerusalem Bureau Chief 
Walter Rodgers on November 21, 1995. The entire report can be found on CNN's web 
page on Internet at www.cnn.com. 
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IV. BRITISH COUNTERTERRORISM AND NORTHERN IRELAND 
The previous chapters on the FBI and the Shin Bet have discussed those 
organizations' methods, successes and scandals in their continuing fight against domestic 
terrorism In Great Britain, however, domestic terrorism has been fought on all fronts by 
different organizations When the "Great Trouble" began in 1969, Northern Ireland tried to 
control the violence perpetrated by the Irish Republican Army (IRA) with the Royal Ulster 
Constabulary (RUC), a country police force. Unfortunately for them, they were 
undermanned and unprepared to engage the IRA. The leader of Northern Ireland petitioned 
the British Parliament for assistance and it came in the form of the British army 
In this chapter, I will examine the various means that have been employed by both the 
British and Northern Ireland Loyalists in combating IRA terrorist acts. This will include a 
look at England's role through the use of MI5, MI6, the Army and the Special Air Services, 
the effectiveness of the Royal Ulster Constabulary and other law enforcement groups within 
Ireland; the use of supergrasses; and the use of extralegal means to convict and incarcerate 
suspected terrorists Like Israel, the British have approached the IRA's terrorism campaign 
with thoroughness and precision 
A.        BRITISH CONTRIBUTIONS TO COUNTERTERRORISM IN NORTHERN 
IRELAND 
The Special Air Services (SAS) was first called to service in Northern Ireland when 
the breakdown in law and order occurred in August, 1969. For a year, the violence between 
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civil rights demonstrators and the RUC (backed by the "B" Specials, a reserve volunteer 
patrol group) had convinced the Protestants that civil war was imminent The Catholic 
community as well as the government in Dublin thought that a pogrom was about to occur. 
The British government and the Protestant government could not agree to what extent 
military support should reinforce law enforcement organizations Finally, the British agreed 
to send support only if there was a complete breakdown of law and order and only after the 
Protestants' law enforcement organizations failed to control the situation, unfortunately, this 
is what happened.100 
In 1920, the British government was planning to partition Ireland into the six counties 
of the North with its own Parliament in Belfast and another Parliament in Dublin to represent 
the twenty-six counties in the Irish Free State. During this planning stage, when elections to 
the new parliaments were being organized, the British government was persuaded to provide 
protection for unionists in the North from the IRA. IRA attacks became so numerous that 
the British authorized the Under-Secretary in Belfast to form the Special Constabulary (or 
"Specials") in October 1920. 
The Specials were divided into three classes: Class "A" Specials were full time reserve 
police who were armed, equipped, uniformed and paid the same wages as regular police. The 
"B" Specials were unpaid, except for a clothing allowance, and expected to carry out duties 
in their own areas on one or two nights per week. "C" Specials were simply men listed as 
100Patrick Geraghty, Inside the SAS (London: 1989), pg. 159. 
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available for emergency services, and they provided their own weapons   The "A" Specials 
eventually merged with the RUC and the "C" Specials were abolished, leaving only the "Bs". 
From the date of their establishment to the mid-1960s, the "B" Specials were very 
successful in countering IRA terrorist activities. While the RUC had a maximum strength of 
about thirty-five hundred, the "B" Specials could call up about twelve-thousand volunteers 
to patrol which prevented the IRA from moving about freely. Pat Coogan, an IRA historian, 
noted that the Specials "were the rock on which any mass movement by the IRA in the North 
has inevitably foundered."101 
In the increasing street rioting and violence of 1969, the Specials were not given 
special training in riot control or modern equipment such as riot shields. Also the Loyalists 
were lobbying for support from the Labor government in London so the Specials were 
eventually phased out. From July 1969, the Specials were only used in a very limited way 
at the discretion of the RUC County Inspectors. They were reinstated fully on August 14 
when the RUC almost lost control of a riot and the government ordered the mobilization of 
the Specials   The number of mobilized men intimidated the smaller violent mobs. 
On August 15, Northern Ireland's government asked the Labor government in 
London for assistance from the British army By the 16th, the army had taken control of all 
riot areas without the assistance of the RUC and the Specials Northern Ireland's Prime 
Minister Chichester-Clarke and Harold Wilson, England's Prime Minister met on August 19th 
101JR Whitten, The Ulster Special Constabulary (Internet, 1995), pg. 2. 
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to discuss the future security of Ireland. Although the record of the meeting remains secret, 
Wilson has stated in a television interview that a decision was made to dismiss the Specials. 
The disbanding of the "B" Specials greatly reduced the amount of street intelligence 
flowing to the government, which, in turn, was not helpful to the British soldiers. The 
intelligence that was available to the army was limited and tended to be inaccurate. By 1971, 
the hard-line Provisional IRA (PIRA) emerged with a bombing campaign. Averaging two 
explosions a day, the authorities became desperate to penetrate the terrorist network. The 
Ajmy adopted the "counter-gang" tactics which had been developed during Kenya's Mau 
Mau period. These tactics, based on three separate factors, were designed to make a shift 
allegiance from one group to another and become an efficient, unrecognizable intelligence 
gatherer. The first factor (the carrot) introduces an incentive strong enough to make the man 
want to shift his loyalty. Then he must be made to understand that failure will result in 
unpleasant consequences (the stick). Thirdly, he must be given a reasonable opportunity to 
prove to himself and his friends that there is nothing dishonorable about his action.102 
ERA activists who were arrested were given the choice of imprisonment or undercover 
work for the British Army. They usually opted for the latter and were formed into the Special 
Detachment of the Military Reconnaissance Force (MRF). The task of these MRFs was to 
drive around Belfast's Republican districts to identify their comrades in the IRA who were 
then placed under surveillance or arrest. Unfortunately, not many of the MRF members lived 
2Geraghty, pg. 163. 
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to enjoy the promised freedom Some attempted to become double agents while others made 
the mistake of returning to their homes They were eventually discovered by the IRA and 
shot or tortured during interrogations. 
This type of intelligence work did not satisfy the Protestant Government. In August 
1971, against military advice, the Northern Ireland prime minister persuaded London to 
introduce internment without trial This move alienated many uncommitted Catholics and 
exposed the lack of information that had been collected by the security forces' intelligence 
system. Many of those people rounded up had had nothing to do with the IRA for years, 
while the real culprits remained on the loose. 
The result was a serious escalation of violence While only fifty-nine people had been 
killed in two years from August 1969 to August 1971, an additional two-hundred thirty-one 
were killed in the following six months. The British government told the Northern Ireland 
prime minister that they were no longer willing to have their army directed by his government 
and the responsibility for that part of security was transferred to London. 
At about this time, the SAS were posted as individuals to Military Intelligence in 
Ulster. The Intelligence Director was a senior officer of the Secret Intelligence Service (MI6) 
which is traditionally concerned with intelligence collection outside the United Kingdom. 
This caused intense resentment in MI 5, which was responsible for Ulster as well as domestic 
counterterrorism.103 
103It was speculated that MI6 was put in charge because they wanted to monitor a 
growing Soviet and Arab interest in the Irish conflict   It was probably more practical to 
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The MI6 Intelligence Director had a direct line to the prime minister in London. 
There was also an intelligence officer from MI5 working in Northern Ireland as well who had 
a direct line to the Prime Minister A third source of intelligence was the Army, who had 
developed fruitful relationships between their undercover agents and their informers. Since 
both were at risk of discovery, these sources of information had to be kept close-hold. This 
resulted in turmoil for those in the field because they did not know to whom they had to 
report. Some intelligence officers believed the IRA's assassination often informers was due 
to a leak which had been overlooked in the confusion 
In 1974, in an effort to impose order on this chaos, more SAS officers were sent in 
to control agents in the field There was political opposition from both the Northern Ireland 
and London government because both were involved in secret negotiations with the IRA. 
The discovery of a "doomsday" plan in a raid on IRA headquarters, however, proved that the 
IRA was not serious about peace but playing for time.104 
The conflict in Ireland created some problems because, politically, London and 
Northern Ireland refused to see this as a war while the soldiers and SAS operatives could not 
presume that Prime Minister Wilson trusted MI6 more than he trusted MI5   There was 
also a traditional link between MI6 and the SAS, who were operating in Northern Ireland 
on a regular basis at this time. 
104n The "doomsday" plan was a collection of documents which revealed specific and 
calculated plans by IRA to foment chaos and sectarian hatred through indiscriminate 
violence in an effort to occupy and control certain areas in Belfast and its suburbs   This 
plan included a "scorched earth" policy of burning the houses of innocent bystanders in the 
event they were compelled to withdraw 
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see it as anything else. A soldier reacting to what he thought was a wartime situation would 
suddenly find himself arrested and facing civil charges, which tended to be very demoralizing. 
At this point, both governments were at a loss as to how to bring this situation to a 
conclusion. Since direct confrontation was not as successful as they wanted, they decided to 
go with political solutions. 
B.        THE PREVENTION OF TERRORISM ACT 
The Prevention of Terrorism Act was legislated in 1974 in response to the campaign 
of violence the IRA sustained in Britain beginning in 1972. This intense violence was 
sustained for a two-year period and by that time, the citizens were truly frightened The 
House Secretary, Mr. Roy Jenkins introduced the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary 
Provisions) Bill to Parliament which was passed in forty-two hours without amendment. The 
Act expired in May 1975 but an extension was successfully put into effect. In 1976, a new 
Act was passed, adding a few more crimes and again, it had to be renewed By this time, the 
renewal process became a formality. In 1984, another review by Earl Jellicoe resulted in the 
Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1984. With this measure, international 
terrorism was added. In 1989, the Act was greatly expanded and no longer limited to five 
years.105 
The most important powers in the prevention of terrorism legislation in Great Britain 
relate to proscription, exclusion, and detention. There are three groups of crimes relevant to 
105K.D. Ewing and C.A. Gearty, Freedom Under Thatcher: Civil Liberties in 
Modern Britain (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), pg 213. 
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proscription. Belonging to the IRA or the Irish National Liberation Army is an offense in 
Britain, punishable by up to ten years in prison. Soliciting or inviting support for the IRA or 
INLA is also prohibited. Secondly, it is a crime to arrange, manage, or address any meeting 
of three or more persons if it is known that the meeting is to support or further the activities 
of these groups. Thirdly, any person who in a public place either wears any item of dress or 
wears, carries or displays an article "in such a way or in such circumstances as to arouse 
reasonable apprehension that he is a member or supporter of a proscribed organization" may 
incur a severe penalty of a fine or up to six months in prison.106 
The exclusion powers of the Terrorism Act are the most widely disliked and 
controversial part of this legislation. If the Secretary of State is satisfied that any person has 
been involved in any part of acts of terrorism connected with Norther Ireland or is attempting 
to enter Great Britain with the intention of committing acts of terrorism, he or she may make 
an exclusion order against the suspected perpetrator A British citizen who has resided in 
England for at least three years is exempt so, in practice this law is aimed at the Irish in 
Britain. Exclusions are usually based on intelligence, forensic evidence and/or previous 
convictions. If a person is detained based on suspicion and remains silent during 
interrogation, this fact may be used against them on the ground that it shows training in "anti- 
interrogation" techniques and they ma\ be excluded   This is, of course, in violation of the 
6Ewing and Gearty, pg 216 
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privilege against self-incrimination, which was anticipated with the formal destruction of the 
right to silence in Northern Ireland 
The Prevention of Terrorism Act also includes a discretion to arrest without a 
warrant, when a constable has reasonable grounds for suspecting an offense against the 
proscription, exclusion or financial provisions The power lies in the period of detention 
without charge that can follow from the arrest. The basic rule is that a suspect may be held 
for no more than forty-eight hours but in reality, this is not the case. A review officer, who 
must be someone who has not been directly involved in the case, studies the suspect's case 
"as soon as practicable after the beginning of the detention".107 The review officer can then 
continue to look at the case at twelve hour intervals but the incarceration can be prolonged 
if the review officer is not readily available. 
The review officer can also authorize continued detention if two conditions exist. First, the 
officer must be satisfied that detention is necessary to preserve evidence relating to the 
offenses Second, the officer must be satisfied that the investigation is being conducted 
thoroughly and quickly 
The two-day detention can be further extended up to five days by order of the 
Secretary of State. The moment an application for such an extension is made, the review 
procedure described at length in the Act does not apply It is futile to object and request a 
judicial review because, given the subject matter of the power involved no court in England 
107A diluted version of this procedure under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 
1984 regulates this period of incarceration 
95 
will dare to review a Home Secretary's decision   There are also no special guarantees in the 
Act about sleep, diet or treatment of detainees, despite the greater length of time involved. 
Some government officials have discovered that detention may not necessarily occur 
for prosecution purposes. Sometimes a detainee is questioned about his or her political 
views, friends and colleagues in an effort to gather background information that may be useful 
later. The police and the army have been known to arrest not only a person against whom 
there is firm evidence but also people connected with this person. This can defeat the whole 
purpose of detention by alienating the innocent and making them more sympathetic to the 
causes of the terrorists.108 
Proscription, exclusion and detention have been fought by many British and Irish 
citizens who see these as an infringement of their civil rights. Although it is not specifically 
mentioned in the Prevention of Terrorism Act, many of these allowances seem to target Irish 
citizens in particular. There is no bill of rights in Great Britain but it has been frequently 
proposed as a solution to the perceived threat to political freedom. Its supporters have 
stipulated that it would have to list political freedoms that are protected such as freedom of 
expression, conscience and religion Parliament would not be permitted to pass laws which 
violate the terms of the bill of rights, and existing legislation would be capable of challenge 
if it went against guaranteed freedoms. 
108In the mid-1970s, one-hundred twenty-two people were detained in London but 
only four were convicted of any offense   Similar sweeps also occurred before Christmas 
in 1979, 1981 and 1983. 
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C.        THE USE OF SUPERGRASSES 
The practice of using informants by Great Britain's police and prosecution authorities 
goes back several centuries. Informants have also been used in trials in Northern Ireland for 
the past fifteen years In November 1981, the RUC arrested William Black in a Catholic area 
of North Belfast. Just over a year later a trial began in Belfast's Crown Court at which thirty- 
eight people were accused of one-hundred eighty-four separate charges stemming from forty- 
five alleged incidents of violence. Black had agreed to cooperate with the authorities during 
his interrogation, provide the majority and, at times, the only evidence against the accused.109 
Authorities like to call those who provide this evidence "converted terrorists" but 
scholars have pointed out that this term is erroneous in that these individuals do not convert 
due to genuine repentance. Most of them cooperate in exchange for shorter prison sentences 
and immunity   A more popular and frequently used term is "supergrass".110 
The development of the use of supergrasses as the principal method of securing 
convictions in Ireland came from the Italian government's response to their political violence. 
In 1978 following the kidnaping and subsequent assassination of Aldo Moro, the Italian 
government introduced a new measure which provided for a substantial reduction in 
1()9Paddy Hillyard and Janie Percy-Smith, Converting Terrorists: The Use of 
Supergrasses in Northern Ireland, Journal of Law and Society, Volume 11, Number 3, 
Winter 1984. 
ll0The term supergrass distinguishes these people from accomplices which covers 
all those people who have taken part in the crime and informers who are usually 
individuals working for the police at the time that the crimes which they describe are 
committed. 
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punishment if the accomplices detach themselves from the others and endeavor to secure the 
release of a victim Subsequent legislation extended the notion of dissociation still further by 
adding cooperation with the police to prevent criminal activity and/or to gather crucial 
evidence leading to the arrest of the conspirators. The Italian authorities expected true 
repentance from the terrorists, which went a long way in persuading the informers to 
participate fully.111 Authorities in Northern Ireland believed the Italians had found an 
excellent deterrent but they were more pragmatic about human nature and the nature of 
terrorists. They were not interested in the motivation or beliefs of the supergrass. The fact 
that they turn is sufficient. Moreover, a repentant terrorist cannot be exploited in Ireland as 
though it was in Italy 112 
The majority of supergrasses have been recruited during interrogation after they have 
been arrested, although some have been drawn from those already imprisoned. The types of 
people who have been recruited have made the whole strategy questionable. One supergrass 
was described as a dangerous and ruthless terrorist while another had an extensive criminal 
record. The inducements used by the authorities include money or a new life, but the most 
attractive was the offer of immunity from prosecution for the crimes which they have 
committed. 
in Hillyard and Percy-Smith, pg. 340 
112The authorities knew that the motivations of a majority of supergrasses is to 
save themselves from unpleasant repercussions such as prison or death.  Sometimes this 
was used as a deterrent to those who were thinking of joining these groups   Loyalty was 
certainly not a prerequisite. 
98 
Although it is granted liberally in Northern Ireland, the prosecution and the public 
have expressed concern over the immunity for supergrasses who have been involved in 
serious crimes. One supergrass who informed and was subsequently granted immunity later 
recanted and admitted to being an accomplice in the killing of an informer. The authorities 
then decided that immunity would be granted only to those who were accomplices rather than 
the actual murders. 
Another objection to the use of supergrasses was the unreliability of witness 
testimony At times, the supergrass is expected to provide information relating to many 
different people covering hundreds of separate incidents stretching back over many years. As 
experimental psychologists have proved, people do forget information and incidents as the 
interval increases between the time of the information's acquisition and it's retrieval. It has 
also been found that it is possible for a subject to take information provided to them, 
eventually believe it to be true and replace their own correct version with that information. 
Supergrasses may unknowingly perjure themselves, believing this specious testimony to be 
true.113 
From various accounts, the authorities were fully aware of the problems of inadequate 
recall and the pressure to produce results. Various supergrasses have stated that the way 
police intervened in drawing up their statements. Others have described that the police have 
given them names, expecting them to implicate those people in terrorist activities 
113E. Loftus and G.R. Loftus, "On the Permanence of Stored Information in the 
Human Brain", The American Psychologist, Volume 35, Number 5, pp. 409-420 
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There are a lot of issues that must be considered during a supergrass trial. In ordinary 
criminal trials where it is discovered that the witness has a criminal record, the jury is warned 
to treat that evidence with caution. However, in a supergrass trial, the case will rest almost 
exclusively on evidence of a person which, in other circumstances, would be regarded with 
suspicion. A supergrass may recant, disappear or die before the case comes to trial. In the 
case of retraction, the alleged terrorists are released unless another supergrass can be found 
to give evidence to hold them 
The supergrass strategy has radically extended the role of criminal law in a unique 
way. In a normal criminal trial, a witness testifies in an individual capacity with the 
understanding that his/her testimony will not have any wider consequences. The activities of 
a supergrass, however, will eventually affect family and friends, who may be used as pawns 
in the strategy. The police need the family and friends to support and maintain the supergrass 
in his commitment to be the principal witness. The IRA use the families and friends as 
hostages in an effort to make the supergrass recant The use of supergrass evidence 
ultimately creates a climate of fear and distrust among those who engage in political violence 
but also within the communities whose interests the strategy is supposed to serve. 
All the strategies which have been tried in Northern Ireland have shown that the 
problem of political violence cannot be dealt with through conventional or radically modified 
criminal justice systems. While it may be possible to achieve "an acceptable level of 
violence," ultimately the law has not been successful in solving this particular problem 
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D.        CEASE FIRE? 
Currently, England and the Republic of Ireland have a Joint Declaration of Peace in 
effect This was made on December 15 1993 to "remove the conflict, to overcome the legacy 
of history and to heal the divisions which have resulted".114 The IRA followed almost one 
year later with a cease-fire declaration on August 31,1994 which included their belief that an 
opportunity for peace had been created by the Joint Declaration and they were going to take 
advantage of it. The Combined Loyalist Military Command (CLMC), the military arm of the 
Loyalists, released their cease-fire statement on October 13 1994 with the hope that everyone 
could "resolve to respect our differing views of freedom, culture and aspiration and never 
again permit our political circumstances to degenerate into bloody warfare"115 
Since the recent troubles began in Ireland in 1969, this latest attempt at peace seems 
to be the best weapon against domestic terrorism in Great Britain. Both the Loyalists and the 
Nationalists perpetrated terrorist activities but it was usually retaliatory in nature with no real 
objective but revenge. In all those years, the political situation did not change nor did the 
views of the Loyalists and the Nationalists   Terrorism created a stalemate. 
Both the Sinn Fein and the Progressive Unionist Party, the political arms of the 
warring factions, have seen the futility of the terrorism carried out by their military sections 
and now see England's offer of peace as an opportunity to negotiate and legitimize 
I14Joint Declaration on Peace (Internet, 1995), pg. 1 
ll5CLMC Cease-fire Statement, (Internet, www.gpl.net/niic/politics, 1995) 
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themselves around the world. Although it has not been said, it seems more than a coincidence 
that they approached this solution after the PLO and Israel signed their peace agreement. 
Perhaps both sides see the futility of violence and are finally aware of how it has affected the 
populace and the economy. Their countries have been ravaged, poverty in both the Republic 
of Ireland and Northern Ireland is at an all-time high and families have been cruelly separated. 
The Irish are weary and seem ready for a peaceful change 
102 
V. COUNTERTERRORISM AND THE CONSTITUTION 
In the previous three chapters, I have discussed the fight against domestic terrorism 
in three countries: the United States, Israel and Great Britain. Each country has had a 
different domestic terrorist problem and each country has chosen to fight it in different ways 
based on cultural and constitutional constraints (or lack thereof) 
In the United States, domestic terrorism has never really been a problem in the past 
compared to Israel and Great Britain. In the 1960s, the FBI was concerned about reactions 
to civil rights and the negative response to the war in Viet Nam. Organizations such as the 
Ku Klux Klan and the Black Panthers were well-armed and not adverse to using extreme 
violence and intimidation to further their goals The FBI felt justified in violating the 
constitutional rights of the alleged terrorists in order to fight what they saw as a threat to the 
security of the United States and they were very successful if not brutal 
While Great Britain and Israel seem to have settled their differences with the IRA and 
the Palestinians respectively (at least for now), domestic terrorism has occurred in the United 
States after a long absence. As mentioned previously, the World Trade Center and the 
Oklahoma bombings have brought it to the forefront in the most tragic way. 
According to one source, there were signs that violence directed at the federal 
government was scheduled to occur on April 19, 1995 Strategic links between militia groups 
and white supremacist organizations had been detected as early as October 1994 through 
various communiques, racist publications and law enforcement bulletins.   A Klanwatch 
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intelligence report pointed out the significance of the April 19 date among militia extremists. 
For more than a year, the Waco burning, the execution of Richard Wayne Snell (a white 
supremacist convicted of two murders in Arkansas), and the Ruby Ridge incident were the 
rallying cry of militia organizations against the federal government They made these 
"injustices"known through meetings, fliers and Internet postings and warned of the "wrath 
of God" descending to avenge these incidents."6 Klanwatch's chief investigator, Joe Roy, 
has warned that, ''the volatile combination of hate-filled rhetoric, paramilitary training and 
heavy weaponry within the hard-core militia underground make the likelihood of further 
violence very high." Although it would have been impossible to prevent the Oklahoma 
bombing, the FBI and other organizations may have been able to put out a threat advisory for 
federal facilities as they did after the event. 
One challenge facing the FBI is conducting counterterrorist investigations and 
operations without violating the constitution as Hoover did liberally in the 1960s. When the 
COINTELPRO came to public attention in 1972, Americans were shocked at the extent to 
which the FBI had delved into private lives Although COINTELPRO was successful and the 
FBI was doing exactly what the President requested, that success was won at the high cost 
of disregarding constitutional rights and even the lives of innocents   Today, United States 
U6This unofficial intelligence was taken from the Southern Poverty Law Center's 
Klanwatch Intelligence Report, June 1995.  Klanwatch has been keeping records and 
gathering information on white hate groups since the early 1960s. They formed a 
Klanwatch Militia Task Force to collect in-depth intelligence on these little-known militia 
groups 
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Citizens are intolerant of such invasions of privacy and as indicated by Congress, would never 
accept expansion of FBI jurisdiction " 
In Israel and Great Britain, however, extended powers granted to the law enforcement 
authorities seem to be welcomed The citizens of these countries have tacitly agreed that the 
primary concern is to get the terrorists and stop the slaughter by any means necessary even 
if that means limited freedoms for them. As discussed in both chapters three and four, most 
infringements of constitutional rights do not affect the general population. In England the 
latest Prevention of Terrorism Act is directed solely at the perpetrators of the crime. An 
alleged terrorist can be convicted based on testimony by a suspect witness and/or 
circumstantial evidence Detention is allowable for up to seven days based on suspicion of 
law enforcement authorities.  In court, a suspect can be tried without a jury.118 Although 
117After the Oklahoma event, Clinton moved to push his anti-terrorism bill with 
several additions that expanded the FBI's jurisdiction and powers. Congress was 
concerned at what they saw as a move to legitimize invasion of privacy and stated the 
potential for misuse, which was common in the COINTELPRO days. 
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 "These courts, known as Diplock courts, were proposed by Lord Diplock, the 
Law Lord in Parliament heading a commission to investigate alternative means through 
law to fight terrorism. In 1972, the British had decided that a military response was not 
effective against a political situation and looked to the law. The Diplock Report stated, 
among other observations, that in this "emergency" situation, jury trials should be 
suspended for certain crimes judged as "terrorist" offenses and the judge should make the 
final decision   This recommendation was based on two assumptions: 1) that jurors would 
be intimidated and 2) that then predominantly Protestant juries would return acquittals 
when face with Loyalist terrorists (See page 212 in Freedom Under Thatcher: Civil 
Liberties in Modern Britain). Unfortunately, these courts are not always convened to 
only prosecute terrorists and they have become an institution assimilated into Northern 
Ireland laws 
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attempts have been made to inform the British public of these offenses to human rights, they 
seem satisfied with the proficiency of their law enforcement officials. 
Israel has basically suspended rights for those Palestinians and Arabs living within 
their borders. Interrogation processes can be harsh, brutal and sometimes deadly Curfews 
are routinely ordered for Arab neighborhoods and searches can be conducted without a 
warrant, often disrupting every day life. The Israeli Jews do not protest these violations of 
human rights since they are not affected. Perhaps this is why right-wing groups have begun 
to come to the forefront 
Both Israel and Great Britain have been under the strain of constant terrorist attacks. 
It seems that when these attacks happen with such frequency, people want results no matter 
what the cost. They are willing to give up democratic freedoms if it brings a halt to deadly 
terrorist activities. 
A.        SYMPATHY FOR THE DEVIL? 
One of the makings of a successful terrorist or terrorist group is to gain sympathy and 
support from the population no matter how serious the crime The usual object of a 
successful terrorist is to put the government in such a position as to prove its ineffectiveness. 
This, in turn, causes the people to distrust the government in power and to turn to the 
terrorists for answers and change. Once that occurs, the terrorists can have a measure of 
success, gaining their demands through the government's impotence. 
Because the population in the United States is ethnically mixed and most of the 
domestic terrorist groups are based on racism and bigotry, sympathy has never been a 
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problem for the FBI. In the 1960s, with both the white and black hate groups, there might 
have been tacit support through money and rhetoric, but when it came down to the dirty work 
such as bombing or murdering, only the most fanatical members could do it Once a heinous 
deed has been committed by a group in the United States, it is like signing their own death 
warrant and waiting for the lynching party to appear. Although militia groups, hate groups 
and pro-life groups work for change in the government, they just do not have the 
overwhelming support of the people Many Americans may grouse about the government, 
but they seem to prefer change through the electoral process because it usually works. 
In Great Britain, however, sympathy has been the determining factor in the success 
of the IRA and the British Army/RUC. When the IRA commits a deed, usually retaliatory, 
they are given whole-hearted approval by the Catholic population. IRA members can hide 
out for long periods of time in a sympathizer's house and financing has never been a problem. 
They have even garnered sympathy and financing from supporters in the United States. On 
the other side, the British and Loyalists are just as sympathetic to the cause of Northern 
Ireland. Even with the cease-fire agreements and the Joint Declaration of Peace in effect, the 
British have made it clear that if the IRA does not lay down their weapons before approaching 
the peace table, they were prepared to risk a resumption of IRA violence. British Tory MP 
Sir Peter Temple Morris stated in an interview with the Irish Republican News that "there is 
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a willingness on this side of the water to tolerate in certain circumstances, the thought of 
violence returning""9 
The Palestinians have always supported their terrorist groups, allowing them to hide 
in their houses or providing them with arms Unfortunately for those terrorist groups, loyalty 
is almost non-existent and sympathizers tire easily, especially if their day to day livelihood is 
threatened. Eventually the terrorists are on their own, which may be why they began to 
attack targets overseas On the other side, the Israelis more or less support their government 
or at least they did until the peace initiatives went forward. Here they found themselves split 
and some right-wing splinter groups took the anti-peace rhetoric very seriously to the point 
of fanaticism. Unfortunately, the Israeli government was unaware how serious they were until 
Yitzhak Rabin was assassinated 
Although sympathy may not bring down the government, it can bring about change. 
In Israel and Great Britain, peace was a long time coming because of sympathizers on both 
sides who were not willing to blink first. Perhaps the fact that elections and public opinion 
have, so far, brought about change when people are unhappy has been the reason why 
domestic terrorism fails to generate sympathy the United States. 
B.        THE TERRORIST'S REASON FOR BEING 
In the United States, those terrorists belonging to hate groups have an agenda based 
on some personal issue   They are racist, anti-Semitic, anti-gay or pro-life and so on.  The 
119Mary Carolan, "British Will Risk Return to Violence Says Tory MP", Irish 
Republican News {lniexnQUwwM.genesis.com, October, 1995), pg  1 
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white supremacists believe that the existence of other races or ethnic groups on an equal level 
constitutes a threat to their way of life. This is not about government control (except that 
some believe the government to be secretly run by Jews and that African Americans are their 
policemen) but a personal belief in their superiority based on history Militia groups believe 
that constitutional rights are being eroded by laws made by the President and Congress. Gun 
control, civil rights and legalized abortion are the government's way of controlling patriotic 
Americans and keeping them dependent. This belief is so deeply rooted that they disregard 
voting and the electoral process. Some militia groups have ties with white supremacists and 
the Ku Klux Klan 
In both Israel and Ireland, terrorists are fighting for land and religion but for different 
reasons. Sinn Fein and the IRA believe that Ireland should be united under a Catholic- 
influenced government. They resent the fact that the British are assisting the Protestant 
citizens residing in Northern Ireland and suspect that they have an ulterior motive (empire 
building). The Loyalist terrorists, on the other hand, believe that if Ireland is going to be 
united, the church and the government must remain separate and religious freedom allowed. 
They have decided that British rule and a continued connection to the Commonwealth will 
assure that, even if it means a divided Ireland. 
Right-wing Israeli terrorists believe that the state of Israel and the occupied areas 
belong to them through their covenant with God. Muslims and Christians, although People 
of the Book, do not have that same covenant and are therefore not worthy of those privileges 
accorded to the Jews  Many of them are orthodox Jews and do not accept the laws governing 
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the modern Jewish way of life Although they were very active during the early days of 
Israel's independence, they went underground and did not emerge terroristically until the 
1990s when peace with the Palestinians began to look like a reality. 
The Palestinians and their supporters believe that they were there first and that the 
region also has religious significance for them. When the various Arab-Israeli wars occurred 
and the Israelis gained land, the Palestinians were told they were no longer welcome and 
became refugees. The PLO began fighting lor defeat of Zionism and recognition as people 
but were unable to field an army to defeat Israel The PLO, therefore, used terrorism as a 
substitute for military aims 
In Israel and Great Britain, they have begun negotiations for peace, which suggests 
that the terrorists were partially successful. The government has recognized them, making 
them legitimate and elevating them to the international arena The Palestinians have gained 
autonomy but hard-core terrorists will settle for nothing less than the obliteration of the Israeli 
state from the face of the earth. The British and the Sinn Fein have yet to begin negotiations. 
White supremacists and militia groups in the United States are asking for changes such 
as repealing abortion and civil rights laws.   Basic freedoms of others are at stake and the FBI 
must ensure their protection as outlined in the Attorney General Guidelines 
C.        POSSE COMITATUS 
As discussed in chapters three and four, the fight against terrorism has fully involved 
the armies in both Israel and Great Britain. The Shin Bet and the IDF have an excellent, 
professional working relationship; they share intelligence information and frequently work 
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together on counterterrorist operations. The military has the weapons and the materiel to get 
into places that the Shin Bet may not be able to penetrate They also have commando units 
who can respond quickly when a terrorist situation escalates 
The British Army was originally called in by Northern Ireland's government when the 
political situation escalated to terroristic proportions. Although the RUC had dealt with small 
outbursts in the past, they were not prepared to face a well-armed IRA. Initially, when the 
Army arrived, they headed all the counterterrorist operations until the RUC protested. The 
British Army changed their operating procedures so that they were technically assisting the 
RUC. Unlike Israel's situation, there were too many organizations involved in countering the 
ERA threat and they were not willing to work together. This created a confused situation that 
inadvertently got men killed. 
In the United States, the Posse Comitatus Act, passed one-hundred seventeen years 
ago, sharply curtails the rights of the military to get involved in domestic law enforcement. 
This does not mean that the military has not been used in domestic law enforcement, as 
evidenced in chapter three, but for all intents and purposes, they do not and will not get 
involved President Clinton's proposed Omnibus Counterterrorism Bill, section 101, offers 
what is considered by some congressmen a dangerous breach in the Posse Comitatus Act. 
The new law would permit the Attorney General, when investigating violations of section 
101, to request assistance "from any Federal, State, or local agency, including the Army, 
Navy and Air Force when biological and/or chemical terrorism is involved Senator Russ 
Feingold, D-Wisconsin, who voted against the Counterterrorism Bill, considers it "a vehicle 
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to undo some of the traditional barriers which separate the federal government from state and 
local law enforcement."120 
David Kopel, of the Independence Institute, shares Feingold's misgivings about 
weakening the Posse Comitatus guidelines  While acknowledging that chemical or biological 
terrorism is not an impossibility, Kopel indicated that there are preemptive measures which 
are compatible with current guidelines: 
"There are perfectly permissible ways for the military to share its expertise regarding 
chemical and biological terrorism with civilian law enforcement personnel. For 
example, it could train the FBI to deal with such threats, and the FBI could pass this 
along to local police. As long as the military is not actually enforcing civilian law, we 
can maintain the characteristics of a free society,"'21 
Israel and Great Britain do not have such limitations when it comes to their 
counterterrorist operations. In Israel, the military seems to be an advantage to the Shin Bet 
but in Northern Ireland thev seemed to be a hindrance As a consideration for future 
counterterrorist operations in the United States, the military does not look like it will be 
participating in conjunction with the FBI due to heavy congressional opposition. 
D.        COUNTERTERRORISM IN THE UNITED STATES. THE FUTURE? 
In this thesis, I have shown that there are many approaches to deter terrorism but no 
matter what seems the best approach, it will always be under the auspices of the government. 
120William Norman Grigg, "Chipping Away at Freedom" The New American, 
(Internet, www.execpc.com ~jfishna072495.txt, 24 July 1995), pg. 2. 
I21lbid. 
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Israel and Great Britain have been battling terrorism for many years and their governments 
have made adjustments to get the better of terrorists and save lives. At times, both countries 
have been supremely successful and in other operations have been tragic failures. No matter 
how long they have been at it, they have not found the absolute answer to deterring terrorism 
and protecting civilian targets. 
The FBI is completely ruled by the constitution and the Attorney General's guidelines 
First and foremost, constitutional rights of the victim pi the terrorist must not be violated. 
Although they had significant successes with COINTELPRO, when it was discovered, the 
public did not remember those successes.   They were appalled by the FBI's violation of 
democracy, the very democracy they were supposed to protect. 
The 1996 Summer Olympic Games will be held in Atlanta in July. Six million event 
tickets will be sold and approximately 260,000 travelers will stay in the city. The 1972 
Summer Olympics tragedy demonstrated the opportunity that a massive congregation of 
world-renowned athletes offered to terrorists, both domestic and international. The FBI's 
involvement in the Summer Games stems from its mandate to counter the possibility that 
terrorists might view the Olympics as an appealing venue in which to execute a terrorist 
attack or stage an incident meant to attract international attention. In addition, historic, 
political, or longstanding ethnic rivalries that may exist among the fans, athletes or officials 
of competing countries may also give way to terrorist acts of violence. The FBI may be 
challenged much more than they were during the 1984 Summer Olympics in Los Angeles 
Working closely with the Olympic security officials and numerous local, state and 
n: 
federal law enforcement agencies, the FBI has headed the effort to form a coordinated 
counterterrorism network to neutralize any potential terrorist threat. Through a coordinated 
effort, security and terrorist concerns have been carefully scrutinized in order to preempt 
potential crisis situations. Only time will tell if those preparations are sufficient or even 
needed. 
The FBI is also investigating industry's effort to combat terrorism through technology. 
For example, there is a move to incorporate taggants into explosives so that they will be easy 
to identify and track after a blast m Other innovations include nuclear quadrupole resonance, 
which scans for frequencies specific to explosives and vapor detection methods, which 
examine and break down the vapor emanating from an explosive device. Many of these are 
currently being used separately or together in airports in Europe and the Middle East with 
excellent results. The Federal Aviation Administration, however, has strict guidelines for 
detection methods and most are too expensive for industries to be willing to produce the 
technology 123 
The FBI cannot wait for the United States to become a battle ground for terrorists 
before it develops a counterterrorist plan The World Trade Center and the Oklahoma 
bombing have shown that more than ever, that they must be prepared and vigilant. It would 
122A. Maureen Rouhi, "Government, Industry Efforts Yield Array of Tools To 
Combat Terrorism", Chemical and Engineering News, July 24, 1995, pg. 2. Identification 
taggants are microscopic color-coded particles that help track the source of explosives 
after a blast. 
123Ibid., pg. 7. 
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be unrealistic to expect them to prevent all terrorist attacks but that should be the goal. 
Working with other law enforcement and intelligence agencies should keep most terrorist 
attacks from being a surprise. 
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